Augmenting Naval capabilities in remote locations by Bostwick, Shawn et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-12
Augmenting Naval capabilities in remote locations
Bostwick, Shawn













 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
Prepared for:  Chairman of the Systems Engineering Department in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Systems Engineering 





    Augmenting Naval Capabilities in Remote Locations 
 
                    By 
 
                Shawn Bostwick    Carlos Perez-Luna 
         Ben Buenviaje      Keri Pilling 
         Ali Fotouhi              Jose C. Umeres 
                           
December 2009 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 





Daniel T. Oliver               Leonard A. Ferrari 
President                                                                    Executive Vice President and Provost 
 
 
This report was prepared for the Chairman of the Systems Engineering Department in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Systems 
Engineering. 
 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
  
This report was prepared by: 
 
 
___________________                                          ___________________      
Shawn Bostwick                                                     Ben Buenviaje 
 
___________________                                          __________________      
Ali Fotouhi                                                             Carlos Perez-Luna 
 
__ _________________                                          ___________________      
Keri Pilling                                                             Jose C. Umeres 
 
 
Reviewed by:                                                         
 
___________________                                          ___________________      
John Michael Green  David Hart, Ph.D. 





___________________                                          ___________________      
Clifford Whitcomb, Ph.D.                                      Karl A. van Bibber, Ph.D. 
Chair                                                                       Vice President and Dean of Research   















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
  REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Augmenting Naval Capabilities in Remote Locations 
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S): Shawn Bostwick, Ben Buenviaje, Ali Fotouhi, Carlos Perez-Luna, 
Keri Pilling, Jose C. Umeres 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER    NPS-SE-10-001 
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
      AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
   A  
 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The objective of this project was to apply a systems engineering approach to explore concepts for 
augmenting naval capabilities in remote sea locations using a standard Systems Engineering methodology coupled 
with Design for Lean Six Sigma tools. Because of increased challenges related to complexity, cost, and timing, our 
engineering approach focused on finding failure modes early and implementing effective countermeasures. 
Following requirements analysis and identification of needed functions, the project team synthesized candidate 
solutions that introduced new concepts and also exploited known programs of record within the Navy, the Coast 
Guard, and the Marine Corps. These included Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
(USVs), the aerostat Multi-Function Phased Array Radar, automation, and a Remote Sea Station. Results from 
analysis and simulations showed that an Automated Super-Highway Concept (ASHC) addressed the immediate 
need. The proposed approach combines the capabilities of the systems above to control the battle space in an effort 
to divert or destroy all non-friendly entities in the areas of interest. This approach also allows for persistent 




14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Systems Engineering. Maritime Domain Awareness. Piracy. Maritime Security 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
192 





































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
ABSTRACT  
The objective of this project was to apply a systems engineering approach to 
explore concepts for augmenting naval capabilities in remote sea locations using a 
standard Systems Engineering methodology coupled with Design for Lean Six Sigma 
tools. Because of increased challenges related to complexity, cost, and timing, our 
engineering approach focused on finding failure modes early and implementing effective 
countermeasures. Following requirements analysis and identification of needed functions, 
the project team synthesized candidate solutions that introduced new concepts and also 
exploited known programs of record within the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine 
Corps. These included Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
(USVs), the aerostat Multi-Function Phased Array Radar, automation, and a Remote Sea 
Station. Results from analysis and simulations showed that an Automated Super-
Highway Concept (ASHC) addressed the immediate need. The proposed approach 
combines the capabilities of the systems above to control the battle space in an effort to 
divert or destroy all non-friendly entities in the areas of interest. This approach also 
allows for persistent presence and analysis of the enemy movement while reducing the 
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The U.S. Naval force paradigm has been changing over the last few decades in 
order to combat emerging threats of the times. Currently, the naval force paradigm is 
once again shifting to a new capability that can combat smaller threats. In a recent article 
in the Naval War College Review, The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm, the author 
Professor Robert C. Rubel describes a force paradigm with four segments: access 
generation, power projection, maritime security, and a series of Maritime Operations 
Centers (MOCs). Although our Navy is unmatched in global dominance, a “Maritime 
Security” force is the paradigm segment whose capabilities are not meeting the goals of 
the mission of maritime security in area of coverage and in response time.  
This capstone project focused on providing a recommendation for augmenting 
naval assets in remote locations in order to prevent piracy, illegal drug trafficking, and 
provide more security within ports, waterways, and coastal areas. The team applied 
systems engineering techniques integrated with Lean Six Sigma techniques to explore 
options for augmenting naval assets. The concept was developed using a combination of 
DCOV (Define, Characterize, Optimize, and Validate) and DMEDI (Define, Modify, 
Explore, Design, and Implement). Requirements were generated by looking at the SIPOC 
methodology (Supplier, Input, Process, Output, and Customer), as well as through the use 
of the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) process. Once the requirements were known, 
a Work Breakdown Structure was formed to meet customer expectations. Once an 
application specific design was chosen, it was modeled and analyzed. The modeling and 
analysis part of the project identified which components of the design would work well 
and where more work would be needed to meet the requirements.  
The analysis considered the needed system‟s three major sub-functions which 
were detect, control, and engage. To complement this analysis of functions, the project 
team developed a concept of operations for how the system could provide an effective 
maritime security force near the coast of Somalia. The outcome of the study revealed four 
critical success factors: persistent presence, response time, area of coverage, and 
maritime awareness. The combination of functions and factors helped develop the 
 xii 
concept which the team called the Automated Super-Highway Concept or ASHC. After 
completing the analysis, the results indicated that a system of systems which included 
using unmanned vehicles would address the piracy problem.  
The ASHC features one or more unmanned Remote Sea Stations (RSS) that act as 
a home base for the semi-autonomous operation of multiple unmanned vehicles; usually 
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs). The ASHC 
includes high altitude airships (aerostats) that provide the exchange networks and 
operations coordination framework that will be used by the system, either at a shore 
facility or aboard a ship. This is necessary to perform Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and provide the ability 
to react to hostile pirates, terrorists, or other adversaries when the need arises. The RSS 
will enable the real-time sharing of data and live video, and refinement of joint 
procedures pertaining to the operation of relatively inexpensive multiple semi-
autonomous airborne and surface vehicles across a specific region. At the present time, 
this can only be accomplished by manned aircraft and surface combatant ships.  
The ASHC will build upon previous intelligent unmanned system investments 
identified on the unmanned system roadmap for the DoD to provide extended MDA 
information and threat detection response information for a region to a centralized control 
station. As a part of the ASHC implementation, interfaces to these existing systems must 
be developed to enable them to share data and video with each other, and the Maritime 
Operations Center (MOC).  
As envisioned, the ASHC will utilize the capabilities of unmanned surface vessels 
(USVs) for surface warfare by extending the MDA defensive envelope of ships and other 
command stations. The ASHC system can be implemented through integration of 
persistent long term remotely deployed threat detection sensors and engagement systems 
onto unmanned platforms and potential manned platforms. 
The ASHC provides flexible control and distributed assets that may be used to form 
a robust and scalable system of sentries to find, control, and deter/destroy threats. The 
proposed RSS architecture has a capability to store, maintain, launch and recover 
UAVs/USVs, and to provide self protection and communications for the sea station and 
 xiii 
Navy unmanned vehicles. To support maintenance and servicing of UAVs and USVs, 
each station will house automated robots similar to those found on a modern production 
line.  
Each RSS is responsible for an area of coverage that is a 200-nm by 200-nm box. 
When multiple RSSs are placed in a line, they provide a continuous defended area for a 
sea lane. For example, ten sea stations can provide sea lane protection along a stretch of 
2,000 nm with a 200-nm width. An aerostat located at every third or fourth RSS provides 
multi-function phased array radar capability for all of the unmanned assets, the mother-
ship or land-based control center, and the MOC. The aerostat also provides high speed 
communications for command and control and near real time video from each of the 
UAVs and USVs and the RSS. Using space links, all communications and video between 
the mother-ship and the RSS can be observed and followed at the MOC.  
In summary, if implemented, the Automated Super-Highway Concept will prove 
to be beneficial to the Navy and the world‟s commercial shipping fleet. By confining 
shipping to a defended area that is only 8 percent of the currently affected zone of pirate 
operations, it greatly reduces opportunities for pirate attacks. In addition, the ASHC 
could perform the equivalent functions of a naval task force estimated to require 29 ships 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As the U.S. Navy steams ahead into the 21st Century, it becomes apparent that it 
faces two potential problems. The first problem is the changing roles and missions that 
the Navy is being tasked with. These new roles and tasks will require a force structure 
change that will significantly impact the composition of the future Navy. Today‟s Navy is 
a power projection force equipped to do battle on the open ocean. The future Navy must 
evolve from “blue water” fighting to littoral combat with smaller aggressors [Rubel 
2009]. Although the concept of littoral combat is still being defined, good examples of 
this include current missions such as anti-piracy and drug enforcement. The second 
problem that the Navy faces is a low number of ships available to make operational 
commitments. This translates to a lack of U.S. Naval presence in areas such as the Horn 
of Africa. The increase in pirate activity in this area has put a taxing toll on the existing 
force structure of the Navy through the requirement for a constant presence. Overall, 
these two problems present a unique set of challenges for the future Navy. It is clear that 
innovative solutions are needed to relieve the pressure off the current force structure and 
to provide the presence needed to respond to conflict in a timely manner. This project 
investigates potential solutions to the problems mentioned above. 
 
B.  DEFINING THE PARADIGM 
In the 2009 article from the Naval War College Review titled The Navy’s 
Changing Force Paradigm, the author, Professor Robert C. Rubel states, “A naval force 
paradigm is a theory of how various types of ships and weapons available to a navy 
should be organized for warfare. The paradigm is governed by the characteristics of the 
principal naval weapons of the day and by the maritime strategy a nation pursues.” He 
further states, “The recently issued Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power 
reflects an institutional response to America‟s changed strategic circumstances and 
embodies a logic that suggests a significant change to the Navy‟s force structure 
paradigm” [Rubel 2009].  
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The new force paradigm suggested by Professor Rubel provides the basis for the 




1. The Changing Paradigm 
Professor Rubel‟s paper outlines the argument that the Navy needs a new force 
paradigm. The Navy started out with small frigates carrying cannons, which could 
operate independently or in small squadrons to protect merchant ships. Upon entering 
into the twentieth century, the United States wanted to become more of a strategic player 
in the world scene. This caused a shift in the Navy‟s paradigm to that of a battleship 
centered fleet with the principal weapon being the large caliber naval gun. World War II 
brought yet another shift to the paradigm following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
In this new change, the fast aircraft carrier became the center of a circular formation of 
ships. The formation was made up of specialized ships to perform certain duties such as 
convoy escort or amphibious operations. All of these paradigms were based on a central 
ship type that supported the primary weapon. By using this concept, it made it easy for 
the Navy to submit additional budget requests to Congress. The Navy could easily justify 
each ship type, along with the number and characteristics needed based on its role in the 
existing force paradigm.  
Currently the Navy is in the initial stages of another paradigm shift. This shift is 
different from those seen in the past such as going from a battleship-centered force to an 
aircraft carrier-centered force. With the increasing lethality of anti-aircraft defenses and 
the effectiveness of newer anti-ship missiles, one must consider making the shift from the 
status quo to a more distributed concept, one oriented on missile firing platforms, such as 
submarines and surface combatants.  
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
competition for supremacy of the seas disappeared and with that, much of the 
justification for maintaining the Navy‟s current fleet assets. In the post Soviet Union Era, 
the United States was left alone as sovereign of the seas. This meant that the Navy could 
now deemphasize some of its warfare areas such as sea control and emphasize other areas 
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such as projecting power ashore in joint operations. Over the course of the last fifteen 
years, the Navy made a realignment to power projection invoking the concept of Carrier 
Strike Groups (CSGs) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) [Rubel 2009]. Since the 
aircraft carrier remained the center of the new paradigm, the transition was easier. The 
Navy could now focus on the geographic hot spots with ships deployed mainly in two 
regions.  
The late 1990‟s saw an emerging emphasis on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
and Littoral Warfare. The result of this emphasis led to the emergence of the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) concept. However, unforeseen events such as the development of a 
ballistic anti-ship missile; China becoming an economic power and able to build a 
credible navy; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 with the resulting two wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; and a resurgence in Russian military power made the Navy uncomfortable 
with the direction they were heading and emphasized the need for a new maritime 
strategy. In 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, called 
for the development of a new strategy. This new strategy, unveiled in October 2007 
called for combat forces concentrated around Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, 
globally distributed, mission tailored forces, and a maritime security network, to work 
together to prevent or limit regional conflict, offer disaster relief, and provide necessary 
services to foster and defend commerce and security [Rubel 2009].  
Studies based on this new strategy conducted by the Naval War College have now 
suggested that the Navy adopt a different style of war fighting and that the Navy consider 
tailoring its forces by region and mission. Based on these studies, Professor Rubel 
continues his analysis by proposing a Force paradigm consisting of four segments:  
 An “access generation” force 
 A “power projection” force 
 A “maritime security” force 
 A series of Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs) 
The first segment, “access generation”, would focus on employing missiles. 
Opposing access denial forces will be the main targets for these missiles. Defending 
against modern missiles is difficult, and this force would use a highly dispersed and 
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covert posture to prevent the enemy from targeting them. The constitution and operation 
doctrine of this force would not be the same for different regions of the world. This force 
will be centered mainly on submarines, especially Special Service Groups Navy 
submarines (SSGNs), and surface ships such as the Arleigh Burke class of guided missile 
destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship. 
The second segment, a “power projection” force, would look much the same as it 
does today. CSGs and ESGs are centered on big deck aviation ships. Instead of its current 
role, show of power, they would become a specialized role-playing force. This new 
power projection force would operate in permissive environments but could support the 
access generation force under certain circumstances.   
The third force segment, the “maritime security” force would be supported quite 
often by elements of the first two segments. This force would have specialized units 
conducting patrols in search of terrorists and other criminals and help establish a global 
maritime security partnership. Professor Rubel recommends that a new and less 
expensive platform should be considered for global maritime partnership missions. 
The fourth segment is a series of MOCs that are currently being established 
around the world. These would not just provide command and control for forces afloat, 
but will also provide various information operations critical to maritime security, power 
projection, and access generation forces. 
 
2. Maritime Awareness 
Although this paper will primarily focus on an approach to implement the 
“maritime security” segment proposed in Professor Rubel‟s strategy paper, The Navy’s 
Changing Force Paradigm, other aspects will also be taken into account, specifically the 
response time of the present day Navy. Because of the size of the Navy today and the 
geographic extent of regions where forces may be needed, it becomes difficult to protect 
all U.S. interests in a timely manner. This is known by our enemies and allows for 
windows of opportunity to attack U.S. interests with little or no consequence. The 
vulnerability to terrorists and criminals has led to the creation of directives to be followed 
by U.S. agencies. One such document is the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 
(HSPD-13), which directs the coordination of Maritime Security Policy through the 
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creation of a National Strategy for Maritime Security issued in December 2004. HSPD-
13 was developed to establish U.S. policy and implement actions to further reduce the 
vulnerability of the maritime domain. This is imperative because more than 80 percent of 
the world‟s trade travels in the maritime domain and maritime security has a high priority 
to national security. Maritime security is no easy task since there are about 30 mega 
ports/cities spread throughout North America, Asia, and Europe. To reach these mega 
ports, 75 percent of the maritime trade must travel through only a handful of straits and 
canals. Figure 1 show the most frequently traveled routes in the maritime domain that 
connect the major ports of the world.  
 
 
Figure 1.   RF signature activity throughout the world. 
   This Figure provides a visual display of RF signals in the world indicated by the 
red dots. The sources from the ocean areas give an indication of ship and aircraft 
densities. The blue dots show major ports of commerce. The purple lines show 
major shipping lanes [21st Century Brief 2001]. 
 
Since the U.S. carries out approximately 90 percent of its commerce trade in this 
maritime domain, the U.S. Navy must protect the national interest of maritime security. 
As a solution to covering the vast distances involved, the U.S. has concentrated naval 
forces around Spain, Pakistan, and Japan. Figure 2 shows the movement capability of 




Figure 2.   Movement Capabilities of Naval Forces. 
   The light blue circles show how far naval ships can travel in 24 hours; the 
next lighter ring is the amount of travel in 48 hours, and the larger ring 
shows projected movement at 96 hours [21
st
 Century Brief 2001]. 
 
Reference to Figure 2 clearly shows that unless there is a naval vessel within close 
proximity it becomes difficult to respond quickly to an emergency in the majority of the 
oceans. 
Another guiding directive is the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 
2006 (or SAFE Port Act, Public Law 109-347). This act has required that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security develop a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international 
supply chain. July 2007 saw the completion of the Strategy to Enhance International 
Supply Chain Security, which establishes a framework for the secure flow of cargo 
through the supply chain by building on existing national strategies and programs 
[Department of Homeland Security 2007]. The protocols and guidance for resumption of 
trade following a transportation disruption or transportation security incident plays an 
important part of this strategy. The international supply chain, as defined in the strategy, 
“is the end-to-end process for shipping goods to or from the United States beginning at 
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the point of origin (including manufacturer, supplier, or vendor) through a point of 
distribution, to the destination.” 
Enforcing the SAFE Port Act is becoming increasingly more difficult, especially 
around the Horn of Africa, where acts of piracy are on the rise (Figure 3). In this region 
pirates are operating in 1.2 million square nautical miles of ocean where there are only 30 
warships from 14 nations on patrol to deter them. The lack of adequate protection by the 
warships is highlighted by the pirate attacks on the Maersk Alabama in April 2009. It 
took the USS Bainbridge three days of steaming to reach the site of the attack. The U.S. 
needs to increase its presence in order to protect its maritime interests. 
 
 
Figure 3.   2008/2009 Attacks. 
   A map showing Somalia and the surrounding area and a number of reported 
pirate attacks in 2008 and 2009 [British Broadcasting Company 2009]. 
 
One of the last reports mentions that since February 2009 pirates have attacked 78 
ships near Somalia, hijacked 19 of them, and held 16 vessels with 300 plus hostages from 
more than a dozen countries [Kennedy 2009]. The pirates held these hostages and ships 
for ransom, which can affect all with higher consumer prices. Piracy has had a severe 
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impact on maritime commerce going around the coast of Somalia and has required 
additional security forces for the protection of shipping, a cost that gets passed on to the 
consumer. 
 
3. Power Projection Issues 
The majority of the U.S. surface fleet is geared toward combating blue ocean 
threats from large nation states. While this is a vestige of the Cold War maritime strategy, 
the Navy of the People‟s Republic of China is an example of a potential blue ocean threat 
for the future. According to the 2009 Annual Report to Congress from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, “China has expanded its arsenal of anti-access and area-denial 
weapons, presenting and projecting increasingly credible, layered offensive combat 
power across its borders and into the Western Pacific. China has or is acquiring the 
ability to: 1) hold large surface ships, including aircraft carriers, at risk (via quiet 
submarines, advanced Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs), wire-guided and wake-
homing torpedoes, or anti-ship ballistic missiles); 2) deny use of shore-based airfields, 
secure bastions and regional logistics hubs (via conventional ballistic missiles with 
greater ranges and accuracy, and land attack cruise missiles); and, 3) hold aircraft at risk 
over or near Chinese territory or forces (via imported and domestic fourth generation 
aircraft, advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles systems, air surveillance systems, 
and ship-borne air defenses). Advances in China‟s space-based reconnaissance and 
positioning, navigation, and timing as well as survivable terrestrial over-the horizon 
targeting, are closing gaps in the creation of a precision-strike capability”. 
Even with the Cold War over, there is a potential for a new battle for sea 
supremacy. To retain its current advantage, the U.S. still needs to have large warships 
available to deter potential threats. This in turn limits the ability to provide adequate 
protection in other areas of the globe to combat new threats such as piracy. This becomes 
especially true today since defense budgets are being cut, forcing the U.S. to find other 




4. Problems at Home 
Not only is the U.S. Navy struggling with the piracy battle in Somalia, there is 
also evidence that our maritime forces face an equally challenging battle in our own 
coastal waters. Daily news reports about how often illegal drugs make it into the U.S. 
every year provide a good example of how we are losing this challenge. In addition, U.S. 
ports are open to a terrorist attack. If a large ship were sunk in the middle of one of the 
mega ports it would shut it down.  
There is also a need for more surveillance of the pleasure craft that operate in the 
coastal waters of the U.S. Many times these small craft get into trouble and the Coast 
Guard does not have a vessel in the vicinity to assist if there needs to be an ocean rescue. 
There is piracy going on even in our own waters. These pirates will seize a yacht, kill the 
people on board, and use the vessel to run drugs into the U.S. Piracy is nothing more than 
high-seas criminal activity, which cannot be addressed by Harpoon missiles or five-inch 
guns from warships.  
The Navy and Coast Guard are unable to protect these areas with current assets. 
This leads to a requirement for systems that could provide a way whereby the maritime 
forces can have a more persistent presence, providing better protection for commerce and 
recreation vessels operating in the coastal waters of the U.S. and in important shipping 
lanes around the world.  
 
D. SUMMARY 
The Navy‟s future conflicts will occur on a much smaller scale. These evolving 
missions require the Navy to prepare itself for expeditionary operations from blue water 
operations to inland operations.  
At the same time, it is clear that the Navy must be prepared to handle large-scale 
threats. The Mission of the U.S. Navy, in addition to winning wars and deterring 
aggression, is maintaining freedom of the seas. Today‟s Navy does not have the means to 
battle small maritime threats or deter potential terrorist attacks on seagoing vessels in an 
efficient and cost effective manner. This shortcoming is the motivating influence for the 
Capstone Project described in this report. 
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The paper consists of five major chapters. In the first chapter, analysis of the 
problem introduced four critical factors that need to be considered for the design of a 
maritime security force near Somalia. Chapter II consists of the Analysis of Alternatives. 
In that chapter, several alternatives for solving the problem are evaluated. Chapter III 
describes the project team‟s technical approach and how the systems engineering 
approach was integrated with Lean Six Sigma techniques. Chapter IV discusses the 
modeling and analysis efforts, and Chapter V presents the team‟s conclusions.  
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II. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The approach selected for this project combined the standard systems engineering 
“Vee” process model of Figure 4 with Design for Lean Six Sigma (DFLSS) tool methods 
to accelerate architectural and engineering development. The DFLSS methodology used 
in this paper is shown in greater detail in Appendix L. The advantage of this approach is 
that use of the DFLSS tool set can facilitate the selection of available concepts and 
technologies and accelerate the development of a viable system solution to the problem at 
hand. Several of these tools were introduced in the previous section; e.g., Affinity 
Diagram and QFD. This section will expand upon and refine the outcome of the analysis 
of alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 4.   “Vee” Model Diagram. 
   The project team followed the Systems Engineering “Vee” Diagram up through 
the Requirements and Architecture phase and stopped at the Detailed Design phase 
[Osborne 2005]. 
 
The starting point for the next phase of analysis was a recent evaluation of the 
missions of the U.S. Coast Guard. Design for Six Sigma (DFSS) tools was applied to link 
strategic goals, operating areas, mission programs, and operational resources into one 
model [Stefanko 2008]. The Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission maritime service 
within the Department of Homeland Security with 11 statutory mandated areas that 
outline its role of protecting the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and security 
 12 
interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk [Six Sigma Forum 
2009]. Figure 5 is the resulting model. 
Because of the limited time available for this project, the focus was on the 
maritime security threats: piracy off the coast of Somalia; Other-law Enforcement; and 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Simplified version of the Coast Guard Strategy.   
   The above diagram shows a simplified version of the latest Coast Guard Strategy 
Plan. This plan is also very similar to that of the U.S. Navy Strategy Plan. [Stefanko 
2008] 
 
Using DFLSS tools linked strategic initiatives to process improvement. Further, it 
facilitated the integrating of project goals with strategic initiatives already in place. This 
link can serve to accelerate concept development and acceptance. Critical to this linkage 
is a bounded set of assumptions that limit the scope of the project to the resources and 
time available. This set of assumptions also helped determine if the solution can be 
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developed within the constraints of existing technology strategies or if a new solution is 
needed.  
The Technology assumptions were derived using the theory of constraints (TOC). 
“The strength of a chain is dictated by its weakest link” is analogous to understanding 
that the performance of any value chain is dictated by its constraints. TOC is a five step 
process that maximizes the performance of a value chain.   
1. Identify constraints 
2. Decide how to exploit the constraints 
3. Subordinate and synchronize everything else to the above decisions 
4. Elevate the performance of the constraints 
5. If any of the above constraints have shifted, go back to step 1  
The above steps are called the 5 Steps of TOC and provide the foundation for 
many generic solutions, which include the management of processes, inventory, supply 
chains, product development and projects (single and multiple), personnel, and decision-
making (Figure 6). For this reason, theory of constraints was chosen for dealing with the 
piracy in Somalia. The fundamental objectives of Maritime Awareness are cost and 
operational effectiveness. Operational effectiveness is achieved through area of coverage, 
presence, maritime security force, and response time. The value chain in this project can 
be simplified to the challenge of ensuring availability of the right assets at the right place 
at the right time while maintaining high-tempo operations. The TOC Supply Chain 
concept can enable the Navy to achieve the fundamental objectives of maritime 
awareness: rapid response to demands, improved on-time performance, reduced need to 
utilize and expedite multiple expensive assets, and better utilize capacity to meet 
customer expectations. [ Bahadir 2006-2007] 
TOC when combined with Lean Six Sigma tools provided improved performance 





Figure 6.  Theory of Constraints. 
  Theory of constraints is utilized to eliminate process variation. In lean, this process 
variation is associated with overburden, fluctuation, and waste. The principle of 
theory of constraints was utilized in the analysis of range with respect to the 
different components selected for the ASHC system.  Reduced process fluctuation, 




A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ROADMAP 
 During the “define” stage of the systems engineering study, the team developed a 
systems engineering roadmap. This roadmap provided team responsibilities and a step-
by-step process to follow. The system engineering roadmap developed is shown in Figure 
7. The systems engineering roadmap utilizes many tools of Lean Six Sigma (Appendix 
L), which facilitated the gathering of large amounts of information in a short period of 
time. The complexity of the system under study, with only a 30 week period for the 
study, required acceleration of information gathering using techniques presented in the 
Naval Postgraduate School systems engineering curriculum, many of which correspond 
to Lean Six Sigma methods being deployed by Department of Defense (DoD). Four of 
the six team members are certified as Green Belt in Lean Six Sigma. 
 During the define stage of a Lean Six Sigma study, strategic roadmaps were 






Figure 7.   Team Roadmap. 
   The team roadmap represents a plan to execute a tailored systems engineering approach. Each color code corresponds to the team 
role and concurrent technical role. Each team role possesses a swim lane. Within each team role, related process blocks exist in 
assigned swim lanes. Team interaction between members occurs in swim lanes, between swim lanes, and by color code. Deliverables 
and enablers are included in the defined process blocks.  
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B. TEAM ORGANIZATION 
The organization of the project team was critical for implementing the systems 
engineering approach. The team organization incorporated the concepts of a learning 
organization and innovative product development environment in which both concepts 
contribute to accelerate product development. The organization fostered a learning 
environment, which emphasized mentorship and guidance in the form of our professors 
from the Naval Postgraduate School. The learning organization utilized the technical 
resources of hull design, sensor development, and unmanned system development. The 
resulting team structure is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Development of the learning organization embedded the stakeholders in 
the process. 
   Acceleration of the systems engineering process occurs when the majority of the 
team understands Lean Six Sigma methodology. The Learning Organization 
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C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A critical first step was stakeholder selection. Once the stakeholders were 
selected, current processes were examined. This led to a current state map, which 
established a common point of view. After the current state map was developed, a cause 
and effect diagram was developed that examined all causes in relation to the effect in 
detail. The data gathered from the current state map and from the cause and effect 
diagram were taken under consideration as the team developed the SIPOC (Suppliers, 
Input, Process, Output, & Customers) diagram. The SIPOC model considers first the 
high-level and then the low-level characteristics of the relationship y=f(x) which is a 
transfer function that helps evaluate the critical parameters of the process.  The intent of 
the SIPOC model is to achieve an understanding of what is critical to the customer. The 
main functional blocks of the SIPOC analysis are listed in Figure 9. Figure 10 shows the 
relationship between the high level and low level characteristics of the SIPOC. Once the 
low level characteristics are determined, the customer‟s needs are placed into a House of 
Quality (HOQ) that compares those needs to measures of Critical- to-Quality (CTQ) 
parameters. Three additional HOQs are needed to determine the customer‟s requirements. 
 
Figure 9.  SIPOC Flowchart. 
   The SIPOC is a process that is used to obtain the Voice of the Customer. By 
understanding the voice of the customer, the systems engineering team focused the 
analysis in the area that is critical to the customer and critical to the process. The 

















Figure 10.   Voice of the Customer and Requirements Generation: Concept Design 
Phase. 
   The requirements generation process starts with a 10,000-foot view SIPOC. Next, 
CTXs from the SIPOC provide input to the process blocks of the 1,000-foot view 
SIPOC. CTXs of the 1,000-foot SIPOC provide input to the customer needs block of 
the 100-foot view HOQ. The HOQ examines the different HOQ in which the final 
HOQ outputs are the requirements of the design. [NAVSEA Lean Six Sigma Green 
Belt Course 2005] 
 
1. Stakeholder Selection 
Professor Robert Rubel, Dean of Strategic Studies at the Naval War College, was 
selected to be included among the project‟s stakeholders. His paper, cited earlier, inspired 
the project team to develop a system that would augment naval assets in remote locations. 
Upon further study of unmanned system developments, the project team became aware of 
the opportunity to augment manpower in the battlefield by employing systems on the 
unmanned systems development road map sponsored by the Department of Defense. 
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Blaise Corbett was selected to be a stakeholder and mentor based on his one-year study 
of the application of autonomous unmanned systems at the Naval War College. Jim 
Hebert, from Dahlgren, Virginia was selected to be a stakeholder because of his research 
interest in remote sea basing and his background in sensors. Eric Henson, from 
Carderock, Maryland was selected as a stakeholder for his research interest in hull 
designs that are survivable under high sea state and his research interest in remote sea 
basing. Table 1 lists the stakeholders and their organization.  
 
Table 1.   Project Stakeholders. 
   This is a list of the identified stakeholders who were able to participate in the 
project. These stakeholders acted as advisors and provided input and guidance to 
the project team.  
 
Name Organization 
James L. Hebert 
Sensor Development and Integration Branch, Q41, Naval Surface 
Warfare Center (NSWC) Dahlgren Division 
Dr. Emmett Maddry Dahlgren Laboratory Chief Engineer, NSWC Dahlgren Division 
Eric Hansen Code 2350. Combattant Craft Division, NSWC Carderock Division 
Blaise Corbett 
Q51- E3 Systems Engineering and Technology Branch, NSWC  
Dahlgren Division 




2. Performance Parameters 
The analysis to determine performance requirements started with an Affinity 
analysis. The Affinity analysis produced the performance requirements shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Performance Requirements. 
 
 
Development of this table included a surface threat analysis. Pirates can 
unexpectedly attack commercial vessels at relatively short ranges. The tendency of 
pirates has been to attack soft targets with minimal defensive capabilities to ensure high 
probability of success. Several parameters were identified such as initial range, detection 
range, maximum and minimum intercept ranges, surface threat velocity, interceptor 
velocity, and process time for launch. These parameters were used to simulate the 
detection, and interception capabilities required to address this threat. Preliminary 
Performance 
Parameter 
Development Threshold Development Objective 
Availability 
24 x 7 for 90 Days, System 
deployment to operational area 
within 20 days 
Same as Threshold 
Coverage 
Persistence coverage within 200 NM 
radius 
400 nm + 
Interoperability 
Link 11, 12, & 16 compatibility, all 
military satellite, secure wireless. All 
systems JTIC certified 
Interoperability with NATO, & 
Coalition, & ability to warn 
adversaries. 
Lethality 
Ability to disable/destroy, small-
medium size targets (over one 
nautical mile standoff strike range) 
A controlled disability/destruction 
capability synchronized with target 
discrimination. 
Survivability   
System shall operate up to  
Sea-State 5. System is capable of full 
operation in all operational areas, 
particularly tropics. System will 
defend against irregular forces. For 
example, such forces are small fast 
boats or small fast attack craft. 
Ability to operate in all states the 
enemy is capable of operation. 
 
Manning 
Extensive use of automation to 
reduce personnel manning and to 
reduce logistical footprint 
To minimize the systems footprint 
in proportion to the discriminated 
threat 
C2 
Ensure man in the loop (links to HQ), 
and prevent fratricide/civilian 
casualties (rules of 
engagement/CONOPS)  
Full automatic and semi-automatic 
operation with man in loop at safe 
remote location 
Reaction time 
Arrive on area of interest within 30 
minutes of notification.  
Arrive on area of interest within 15 




analysis indicated that deterrence through active presence in proximity to potential attack 
routes would be effective. 
 
3. Operational Requirements 
Because of the complexity of the problem and a need to group areas of 
importance, an Affinity Diagram approach was chosen to collect thoughts and ideas 
related to the initial problem statement (see Figure 11). The inputs were grouped into 
functional categories: Detect, Control, and Engage.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Affinity Diagram to Develop Functions to Prevent Delivery of 
Ordnance. 
   Affinity Analysis facilitates participative brainstorming. After the initial session, 
similar ideas are grouped together to develop common themes. Those common 
themes are Detect, Control, and Engage. 
The headers of detect and engage both stood out as important elements for 
consideration in the system while seeking to fully understand the initial problem. The 
functional Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) area was chosen in the decomposition process because 
C4ISR functions will play a key role of exchanging information important to the problem 
set. Early detection is critical to maritime safety, and the assets must ensure responsive 
and continuous C4ISR procedures to shape a successful engagement of the enemy vessel.  
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The prevention system was subdivided into the elements of Function, Component, 
State, and Hierarchical Structure. Detecting an enemy vessel can be accomplished 
visually, though limited by Line of Sight (LOS) and through the use of signatures (e.g., 
electronic, thermal, and acoustic). Signatures help to extend visual detection to Beyond 
Line of Sight (BLOS) ranges. Improved BLOS ranges can be achieved through sensor 
elevation (e.g., higher terrain, an aerial platform, and a satellite) or by taking advantage 
of the adversary‟s platform signatures and physical features (e.g., engine, on board 
communications, reflective properties, existing surface areas, thermal properties, and 
platform movement). 
The project team evaluated the three interoperating systems in combination with 
the four critical factors that the Naval War College studies focused on. The first factor is 
to establish a naval presence in remote locations so that naval forces have superior 
intelligence of enemies of maritime security. The second factor is the area of coverage. 
Being able to limit the area where the enemy of maritime security can engage our forces 
leads to more effective use of resources in remote locations. The third factor is response 
time during which the naval forces must be prepared to engage the enemy before the 
enemy of maritime security can become an undeterred threat. The fourth factor is the role 
of providing maritime security, which is our effective preparation for engagement of 
enemies of maritime security at a zero incidence level of a loss of a High Value Asset 
(HVA). An HVA is an asset determined by the enemies to be so valuable that the risk of 
death is a lower concern than obtaining the asset. The four critical factors support the 
concept of a maritime security force deployable around the world and around the coast 











A. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVES 
The Somalian piracy problem was chosen as the most stressing scenario for the 
analysis of current alternatives. It was assumed that other viable scenarios are a subset of 
the Somalia problem. A general approach was developed to analyze the Navy‟s available 
platforms and candidate new concepts that could be used to address the factors identified 
in Chapter I (maritime awareness, response time, area of coverage, and persistent 
presence).  
 
1. Other Research  
While piracy is not a new problem, the scale of the current threat presents a set of 
challenges that confound the traditional methods for combating this issue. A search of the 
existing literature documents the scope of the problem, but failed to reveal information on 
methods to contain the emerging threat outside of traditional naval force. As a result, the 
project team focused on evaluating existing platforms, both mobile and fixed to 
determine their effectiveness in combating the piracy problem in Somalia.  
Currently, the problem in Somalia is being dealt with by using a traditional naval 
task force. This force, Combined Task Force 151, is a mobile naval force of 30 warships 
involving 9,000 personnel, 30 helicopters, and a smaller number of UAVs. With the 
battle space being 1.2 million square nautical miles, the area of coverage is too large for 
the existing number of warships to patrol effectively. This also means there is not a 
persistent presence. Along with the lack of being present, comes a decrease in response 
time because of the vast distances between patrolling warships. Maritime awareness is 
reduced because of all of these factors. Even though the number of ships increased from 
20 to 30 ships in a six-month period, there were still about 146 reported attacks; 
indicating the problem still has not been resolved. This data shows the Navy is struggling 




Two possible solutions to combating the pirates in Somalia have been proposed 
by Northrop Grumman. However, they rely on the traditional naval task force concept. 
One concept involves 20 naval vessels, 6,900 personnel, and a combination of 20 SH-60 
helicopters and a squadron of P-3s. The battle space covered by this concept is 480,000 
square nautical miles and has an estimated cost of $7.2 million per day. The second 
concept approach involves 7 naval vessels, 14 Fire Scout, unmanned autonomous 
helicopters, 7 SH-60 helicopters, and one squadron of Broad Area Maritime surveillance 
(BAMS) unmanned aerial vehicles at a total cost of $1.7 million per day. This approach 
also has a battle space of 1.2 million nautical miles, comparable to that covered by 
Combined Task Force 151 [Newscast 2009]. 
According to the analysis performed by Northrop Grumman, a traditional naval 
task force cannot cover the entire area. In reality, their analyzed battle space is less than 
one-half the area of concern; resulting in a deficiency in the area of coverage even more 
pronounced than identified in their results. This translates into a response time that is 
insufficient for most distress calls.  
Clearly, this shows that a traditional task force is not the answer in solving the 
persistent presence problem, necessitating a look at other potential platforms. The 
examination of potential platforms is needed because the platform is the weakest link in 
the system. Solving the piracy problem is dependent on having a capable platform. That 
will provide; persistent presence, short response time, large area of coverage, and 
comprehensive maritime awareness.  
 
2. Preliminary Problem Analysis  
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) is an excellent method that can be used as a 
first step in matching platforms with mission requirements. The systems engineering 
team completed a House of Quality (HOQ) matrix that examined potential platforms that 
currently exist and some new concepts in the Navy and the Coast Guard. The HOQ is 
shown in Figure 12. The columns represent each platform (i.e., each potential solution). 
The rows represent the capability to react to common maritime security threats (the 
requirements). These threats where then given a numerical value (i.e., weighted value) 
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based upon their criticality for being enforced. The strength of the relationship between 
the requirement and the platform was given a numerical score. The score for strength of 
the relationship and the weighted value of the requirement were multiplied. Each one of 
these numerical values was added and the sum corresponding to each platform was 
recorded. The platform with the greatest sum was ranked highest in satisfying the 
customer needs. Those needs are the missions of maritime security. The results of the 
QFD analysis gave an importance weight of 618.8 for the remote sea station concept. The 
remote sea station ranked the highest in importance weight. The remote sea station 
concept scored best in responding to 8 of the 10 common maritime security threats 
identified. In second place, the fixed oil rig produced a weighted importance score of 
237.5. The fixed oil rig is a viable alternative although, not for Somalia‟s problem. The 
fixed oil platform is not a good alternative in Somalia because it does not have the 
mobility that is necessary in combating the pirates. This concept would be ideal for use as 




Figure 12.   Analysis of Existing Platform Alternatives. 
   The QFD method concludes that no existing platform can fulfill the mission requirements. With the cooperative analysis, our team 




3. Needs Analysis 
A needs analysis was performed to refine the initial problem statement into a set 
of effective needs. The Navy has already identified capability gaps in the maritime 
interdiction mission, and the threat posed by small boats particularly in the littoral 
environment. 
 
a. Primitive Needs 
The primitive needs analysis focused on ways to implement the “Maritime 
Security” segment proposed by Professor Rubel. As previously stated, it is difficult for 
the Navy to protect U.S. interests in a timely manner. In response to this problem, policy 
directives have been issued by the President and Congress, an example of which is 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (or HSPD-13), which directs the 
coordination of Maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for 
Maritime Security. Another guiding directive is the Security and Accountability for Every 
Port Act of 2006 (or SAFE Port Act, Public Law 109-347).  
 
The primitive needs statement is as follows: 
Friendly forces require a rapid response capability to prevent smaller adversaries 
from attacking (delivering ordnance of any kind) against naval/ commercial vessels, or 
critical ports and off-shore installations. 
 
The current emphasis on the LCS and the considerable investment of resources 
and active support from the Secretary of Defense provide additional evidence of this 
capability gap. This project‟s effective needs are supported by organized evidence as 
indicated in Chapter I, based on analyzing current and future trends. The Navy and DoD 
are focused on mitigating the threat from small and medium size boats and they are 
allocating considerable resources to alleviate the capability shortfall. Based on the 
analysis, the project team can infer that it may be possible to utilize available mature and 
proven technologies.  
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b. Capability Gaps 
The Navy‟s established capability gaps, which resulted in the development of the 
LCS, are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Mission Warfare Tasks and Related Capability Gaps. 




USS Freedom (LCS-1) is the first LCS operated by the Navy, and it has been 
undergoing sea trials since August 2008. A second LCS, USS Independence, completed 
sea trials in November 2009. Analysis indicates that the capability gaps will not be 
drastically changed by the current LCS availability schedule as it relates to the maritime 
interdiction mission in the next 10 years. 
Under established plans, the first deployment of the USS Freedom was scheduled 
for 2012, however according to the Navy Times, CNO Roughead wanted to use the first 
LCS to patrol for pirates off the coast of Somalia prior to that date. The second LCS USS 
Independence is scheduled to be delivered in late 2009. According to the statistics posted 
on the official Status of the Navy Web site only 39 percent of the U.S. Navy ships are on 
Inadequate number of surface 
combatant assets and helicopters 
provide self defense capability only in 
port operating area
Inadequate number of mine counter-
measure assets in the force to clear 
transit lanes within 7 days
Inadequate number of assets and 
technology to detect submarines in 
shallow water 90% success rate
Capability gaps identified with 
current and programmed force 
structure
Gaps exist in coverage areas in 
defeating 50 or more small boats, due 
to shortfall in the number of assets
Mission Task
Surface Warfare: Escort 
ships through choke points
Protect operating areas 
and ports
Mine Warfare: Establish 
and maintain mine cleared 
areas
Anit-submarine Warfare: 
Protect joint operating 
areas
Criteria to Measure 
Success
Neutralizing large sets of 
small boats in a single raid
Neutralizing small sets of 
small boats in a single raid
Clearing transit lanes within 
7 days




deployment [NAVY.mil 2009]. If current LCS production rates are factored in with 
deployment schedules, the project team can conclude that very few (fewer than 5) LCSs 
will be deployable by 2015. The Navy‟s LCS vessels are tasked with the primary 
missions of mine, anti-submarine, and surface warfare. Therefore, it cannot be assumed 
that the total force will be available to support maritime interdiction missions. The LCS 
differs from existing types of Navy surface warships in fundamental ways since it will 
accomplish its primary missions through the use of helicopters, unmanned vehicles, and 
other systems that operate at a distance from the ship. The systems used to conduct each 
mission will be contained in mission modules to support the various warfare areas. The 
mission modules will be interchangeable, so that the LCS can be reconfigured depending 
upon its tasking. Although they are less expensive than larger vessels to build, maintain 
and operate, the LCS cost estimate is $370 million for the sea-frame and approximately 
$150 million for the mission packages (not including the cost of the MH-60 helicopter). 
Another challenge that will hamper LCS global maritime interdiction operations 
is the logistics support required to meet the Navy‟s goal of changing LCS mission 
modules within four days of arriving at an appropriate facility. Limiting factors posing 
potential challenges include package storage location, how they are transported, and the 
proximity of LCS operating areas to ports when swapping of mission modules is 
required. LCS mission modules would not be changed in open waters, so the vessel will 
have to reach a friendly port before a different mission can be performed. These factors 
could increase the time required for a change in LCS mission modules, and impact its 
availability for maritime interdiction missions.  
LCS is clearly a critical asset for the U.S. Navy. However, based on current 
shipbuilding schedules and operational tasks, LCS is not the most mission oriented and 
cost effective approach for performing the maritime interdiction missions. 
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B. CURRENT AND NEXT FUTURE STATE MAPS 
Another key element of the analytic process is the current state map. This map 
communicates the present operating state of the system. A cause and effect diagram was 
derived next to determine the root causes of the problem. Once the causes were 
determined, recommendations for improvement in the system were examined. The 
recommendations were used with another voice of the customer tool, the SIPOC, which 
determined what was critical to the customer. With knowledge of what the customer 
wants and with input from the systems engineering team, development of the Quality 
Function Deployment (QFD) began. The QFD was used to look at suitable platforms that 
could be utilized to eliminate the root causes. Finally, the future state map was 
developed, based on the conclusions of these processes.  
Stakeholder analysis and Lean Six Sigma, when combined, start with the 
development of a current state map. The purpose of the current state is to establish a 
common communication point with the stakeholders and the systems engineering team. 
After completion of the current state, the cause and effect diagram is developed. The 
current state of battling pirates off the coast of Somalia, shown in Figure 13, shows the 
team that a Mayday call is received before any action is taken. Once a call has been 
received, a response/acknowledge is sent and a helicopter or boarding party is launched 





Figure 13.   Current State Map. 
   The current state map consists of eight major steps which provided input to the 
SIPOC.  
 
The current state map reflects the current process for handling pirates in Somalia. 
The project team looked through each process for unneeded steps. The analysis 
eliminated three out of eight steps. The overall intent of our study was to eliminate 
delivery of ordnance, which means the pirate cannot attack the HVA. Therefore, the 
project team eliminated the following three steps; launch boarding party, search boat for 
contraband, detain arrest pirates. Figure 14 represents the next future state, which does 








































Figure 14.   Future State Maps. 
   From a Lean Six Sigma perspective, the project team was trained to eliminate 
waste from the process. Based on the Cause and Effect analysis, Step 3 can be 
eliminated if the enemy is prevented from inflicting harm to the high value asset. 
Consequently, step 6 and step 7 can be eliminated if step 3 is eliminated. Eliminating 
these steps would reduce the future state map to five steps. 
 
1. Cause and Effect Analysis 
Previously, the project team developed a common process for handling the threat 
of pirates off the coast of Somalia. Next, the project team examined all the potential root 
causes that lead to the set of effects; i.e., kidnapped victims, hijacked ships, and lost 
income of maritime nations. Through the Cause and Effect diagram the project team 
identified the following five potential root causes which are elaborated on in Figure 15: 
 Pirates adapting tactics to target large assets;  
 The area to be defended is 1.2 million square nautical miles;  
 Defender cannot reach the target of interest on time; 
 Warships deployed in the region have an average range of coverage of 200 
nautical miles; and  





























The root causes reveal that response time (Cycle Time) must be controlled before 
the enemy can reach the target, a HVA. The time to reach the target is a function of 
distance and velocity. The threat distance to the HVA could be controlled if the 
developed concept included control of the battle space. Therefore, the time to reach a 
target is minimized by selection of equipment with the speed needed to travel to the HVA 
before the enemy can attack. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Cause and Effect Diagram of Pirate Actions and Responses from 
January - February 2009. 
   The Cause and Effect diagram examines the cause and effect of factors of the 
Somalia Piracy threat to Maritime Security. The analysis revealed root causes that 
include the fact that the defender does not have sufficient speed.  Another root cause 
was that the battle space was too large to be defended with current assets.  
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In response to the Cause and Effect analysis, the following recommendations are 
made: 
 Root Cause: Pirates are adapting tactics to target large assets  
Recommendation: Limit the types of tactics that the pirates can employ. 
The first of the four critical factors is to establish a naval presence in 
remote locations so that naval forces have superior intelligence of enemies 
of maritime security. 
 Root Cause: Defended space is 1.2 million square nautical miles  
Recommendation: Limit the defended space so that a reasonable, 
affordable force can be effective. The second critical factor is limiting the 
area to be covered, because limiting where the enemy of maritime security 
engages our forces leads to effective use of limited resources in remote 
locations. 
 Root Cause: Defender cannot reach the target of interest on time & 
defender may not reach the victim for more than three days. 
Recommendation: Minimize the response time so that assets can reach 
the target in time to be effective. The third critical factor is the response 
time within which our naval forces must reach and engage the enemy 
before the enemy of maritime security can become an undeterred threat. 
 Root Cause: Warships deployed in the region have an average range 
of coverage of 200 nautical miles.   
Recommendation: Increase the range of sensors and the defender’s 
combat radius. The fourth critical factor is range of sensors and the 
effective range of the assets embarked on the defender‟s warships. 
The Cause and Effect diagram determined some underlying issues of the problem. 
The analysis revealed that the needs of the customer would be satisfied if the project team 




2. SIPOC ANALYSIS 
As noted before, the SIPOC analysis is another team consensus building process 
used to develop a chart of the complex interactions among functional blocks. The final 
product is used to develop Critical-to-X‟s (CTX) where the X in CTX, can be delivery, 
safety, cost, quality, morale, process, or customer. This form of analysis focuses on what 
is critical to the process and what is critical to the customer and it works well when the 
team first considers the High Level view point and then the Low Level view point. For 
this project, the High Level view represents the strategic point of view and the Low Level 
view represents the view point of the users in the field or the tactical view. 
 
a. High Level SIPOC View 
A critical item that came out of the High Level view analysis is the need for a 
Maritime Operations Center or a MOC. The MOC is critical for providing command and 
control of assets that can respond to the need for protection of HVAs. The MOC is also at 
the heart of the strategies described by Rubel [Rubel 2009]. Critical items are also known 
as Critical-to-the-Process (CTP). CTPs from the analysis are shown in Table 4. 
The High Level SIPOC analysis provides inputs and outputs essential to the process. 
After the SIPOC form is completed, the “critical-to” trees are developed. The critical-to 
tree for this SIPOC examines what is Critical-to-the-Process (CTP) and what is Critical- 
to-the-Customer (CTC). 
Critical-to-the-Process (CTP) 
 CTP 1 – Need sensor with high resolution. 
 CTP 2 – Need unmanned system with quick response.  
 CTP 3 and CTP4 – Need hull that can withstand the environment and sea 
state of operation. 
 CTP 5 – Need system with response time that allows interception wait 
time for the enemy. 





 CTC1 – Must Protect High Value Assets. 
 CTC2 – Must Protect Naval Forces in remote locations. 
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Sensor with High Resolution Protection of High Value Assets
Unmanned System with Quick Response Protection of Naval Force in Remote Locatin
Hull that meshes with Environment  
Hull that satisfies Sea States  
System that has some wait time for response
SUPPLIERS INPUTS PROCESS OUTPUTS CUSTOMERS
Unmanned System Roadmap UAV/UUV/USV Limitations Step 1: Receive Mayday Call Plan for Area of Coverage Dean Rubel - Changing Paradigm 
AESOP - Naval Assets Listing UAV/UUV/USV Missions Step 2:  Respond to Call Plan for Naval Presence Dean Rubel - Area of Coverage
Coast Guard - Strategic Plan Exisiting Platform Analysis Step 3:  Launch Helicopter Plan for Role of Maritime Security Dean Rubel - Naval Presence
Naval Sea Power 21 Fishbone Analysis - Somalia Step 4:  Launch Boarding Party Plan  for Response Time Dean Rubel - Role of Maritime Security
Changing Paradigm Sensor Function Analysis Step 5:  Deter Pirates Development of Sensor Plan Emmet Maddry - Systems Engineering Approach 
White Papers - UAV's and Automation Generic System Design Step 6:  Search for Suspect Pirates Development of CONOPS Emmet Maddry - Technology Selected 
ABB/Fanuc/Kawasaki Application Specific Design Step 7:  Find Contraban WBS Jim Hebert - Sea Base Concept - Patent Pending
DARPA Research Systems Engineering Roadmap Step 8:  Detain/Arrest Pirates  Simulation of ASHC Eric Hensen - Sea Base Concept - Pantent Pending
Gerogia Research Sensor Coverage Analysis Step 9:  Lean Vessel and Return  Simulation of Single UAV and Warship OPNAV - Wargames for Maritime Domain Awareness
QFD Analysis MDA - Somalia Simulation of Dual UAV and Warship Dr. Rubel - Response Time
Concept Development MDA - Communications Response Analysis in Crystal Ball Navy - Limited Resources
Lean Six Sigma MDA - MOC Requirements Generated Navy - Ability to Respond
Leanring Organization - Mentors Work Structure Diagram Blaise Corbett - Use of Unmanned Resources
 
   
   
  
  




b. Low Level SIPOC View 
The Low Level SIPOC view, Table 5, examines the current state of the process in 
relation to the users of the process. Notice that in the future state, steps 3, 6, and 7 have 
been eliminated. Therefore, the Low Level SIPOC view reflects elimination of unneeded 
steps.  
Table 5.   Matrix of low level SIPOC. 
   This Table highlights the elimination of steps 3, 6, & 7 to reflect the outcome of the 
future state map. 
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What is critical to the process?  
 CTP 2.1 = Speed  
 CTP 2.2 = Effective Weapons  
What is critical to the customer?  
 CTC 2.1 = Vessel and Victim 
c. Stakeholders Analysis Summary 
The stakeholder analysis produced design elements for the project concept. 
Multiple analyses led to the conclusions that there were four critical factors necessary for 
combating Somalia pirates. The analyses described above prepared the team for systems 
integration with the generic design concept. 
 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED REQUIREMENTS 
A QFD model was developed in the analysis of alternatives as a way to evaluate 
requirements. The following QFD analysis is a further refinement of that first step. 
 
1. Quality Function Deployment  
The research of platforms and unmanned systems was used as an input to the 
HOQ process. The HOQ of Figure 16 allowed the team to benchmark competitive 
systems and see the benefit of complementary actions or the harmful interaction of two or 
more proposed actions. The far left column has the list of customer wants along with 
weights for each “want”. The top row below the ceiling of the house represents the “how” 
which satisfies the desired “what.” The correlation between the “what” and the “how” 
was tabulated with a score indicating how well the “how” produced the “what.” Each 
“how” was then linked to an action that would get the customer the “what” that is 
required. Each QFD level is known as a House of Quality (HOQ). There can be many 
levels of HOQs, for example: 
 QFD House of Quality Level 1 – Mission Versus Platform  
 QFD House of Quality Level 2 – Platform versus Measure CTQ  
 QFD House of Quality Level 3 – Measure CTQ versus Function 
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 QFD House of Quality Level 4 – Design Elements versus Requirements  
Appendix D contains the HOQs. The project team addressed customer needs by first 
analyzing the HOQ for mission versus platforms. Results from this analysis reinforced 
that either an oil platform or an autonomous sea station would fit the requirements. The 
analysis of the HOQ for platforms versus measured CTQs showed that the oil platform 
was less effective than the remote automated sea station. The analysis of the HOQ for 
measured CTQs versus system functions was influenced by the need to reach the target 
on time and the need to increase the coverage range. Finally, the analysis of the HOQ for 
design elements versus requirements led to two major requirements. The first requirement 
was that the defender needed the ability to stay stationary and the second requirement 
was that the defender needed to travel at speeds up to ten times the speed of the enemy 
pirates.  
The HOQ analysis shown in Figure 16 concluded that no existing platform could 
fulfill the mission requirements. When compared to competitive options, it was 
concluded that the Remote Sea Station rated highest in 8 out of 10 categories and was the 





Figure 16.   HOQ – Mission versus Platform. 
   Reference Item 1: This item shows missions of Maritime Security that our team 
has chosen to address.  
   Reference Item 2: The missions of Maritime Security that would apply suggest 
that an oil platform and a remote autonomous sea station would fit our need.  
   Reference Item 3: Indicates that the ability to meet mission requirements varies 
greatly among sensor and vehicle types. Detection of submarines, prevention of 
terrorism at ports, and interdiction of piracy each present distinct system needs. 
(This HOQ is one of a group of HOQ‟s located in Appendix D.)   
 
2. Future State (Overview) 
The Future State was developed based on the conclusions of the analysis 
conducted by the systems engineering team. The future state was analyzed with the 






Figure 17.   Simulation Model. 
   The future state is depicted in the simulation model in which the basic UAV 
functions are modeled. The future state is achieved with the help of UAV functions, 
sensor functions, and replenishment functions. 
 
The simulation was used to compare the following alternatives: a warship housing 
a single UAV, a warship housing two UAVs, and a remote sea station housing two 
UAVs. The goal was to determine how well each alternative could handle a random 
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1. Sense the target  
2. Warm up the UAV 
3. Launch the UAV 
4. Intercept the Pirate 
5. Warn the pirate to withdraw or be destroyed 
6. Kill the pirate if he is not deterred 
The pirates were given the capability to decide at random whether the pursuit of 
the high value asset (the target of interest) was to be continued. The simulation also gave 
the pirate the capability to withdraw when a UAV was deployed. Results indicate that a 
remote sea station is in a mode waiting for the pirate 100 percent of the time. The results 
also indicate that there is a possibility that the Warships would miss the pirates 
approximately eight percent of the time.  
 
a. Future State: Automated Super-Highway Concept of Operations 
The Future State is explained by describing the events that occur in the 
operational scenario and the supportability scenario. 
   
i.  Operational Scenario 
In the operational scenario, a merchant ship is steaming along in the Indian Ocean 
off the coast of Somalia. The merchant ship approaches a controlled sea lane known as 
the Automated Super-Highway Concept (ASHC). The merchant ship will be designated 
as a HVA. A transponder that functions as a beacon and as a Mayday transmitting device 
would be given to the HVA prior to entering the ASHC to identify it as a platform of 
interest. The transponder signal is picked up by the aerostat and is transmitted back to the 
command ship.  
The ASHC is a system of systems comprised of ten essential elements with 
supporting assets and materials that will be described shortly. The system maintains 
situational awareness and provides protection of HVAs inside the sea lane.  
As the ship moves through the ASCH, the sensing process detects a target of 
interest approaching the outer perimeter of the ASHC. Initially, the sensing system does 
not know if the target of interest is friendly or unfriendly. Since the target of interest is 
45 
 
not carrying a transponder, the sensing system knows that it is not part of the group of 
ships being defended or an element of the ASHC. Once the target of interest breaches the 
ASHC boundary, the sensing system will evaluate how far the target of interest is from 
all HVAs within a 20 nautical mile radius. If any HVA is within 20 nm of the target of 
interest, the closest Remote Sea Station (RSS) will launch a UAV to intercept the target 
of interest. Each UAV has a warm up time. This warm up time is included in the 
calculation that determines if a UAV can reach the target and that determines when to 
launch the UAV from the RSS. The objective of the UAV is to reach the target of interest 
before it reaches a point 8 nm away from the HVA. The reason for this objective is that 
the Electro Optical or Infra Red (EOIR) system on board the UAV will need time to 
classify the target as friend or foe. Once this determination is made, the UAV will do one 
of two things. The UAV will either follow the target to see its intentions or the UAV will 
deter the target if it performs any hostile activities. A friendly target will be allowed in 
the zone; however, the friendly unit‟s path will be monitored. An unknown, an enemy 
unit, or a foe will be intercepted. Once intercepted, the UAV will initially transmit a 
warning. The enemy unit will be allowed to leave the ASHC zone if the enemy decides to 
withdraw. If the enemy decides to continue pursuit of a HVA unit or travels to within 8 
nm of the HVA, the command ship will transmit a firing command to the UAV. The 
UAV will use some means of deterrent to stop the enemy. The UAV will return to the 
RSS after the enemy is successfully deterred. The HVA will continue travelling through 
the ASHC zone until it reaches the transponder drop off zone. Once the transponder is 
returned, the HVA is no longer tracked. 
 
ii.  Supportability Scenario 
The above process describes a typical transit for a HVA. Once the UAV has 
completed its mission, the UAV will travel back to the RSS. The supportability scenario 
describes the replenishment and the maintenance process. The processes described are 
technically complex, so the project team will explain in more detail as required. The 
UAV and RSS will have sensors that track fuel usage, fuel inventory, armament usage, 
armament inventory, system status, condition based maintenance logs, maintenance 
supplies such as critical parts, and lubrication status. After completing the mission of 
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deterrence, the UAV will approach the RSS. The RSS will have situational awareness of 
the UAV and will open its landing bay in advance of the UAV‟s arrival. The landing bay 
will open a water tight hatch door. A positioner will move the landing bay to a locked 
location. The UAV will be guided in to the landing zone. Once the landing bay has 
received the UAV, the positioner moves back to the home position. The hatch door 
closes. The system log will have information on armament used, fuel used, and 
maintenance history in terms of hours of operation. A graphical user interface will have a 
Central Processing Unit (CPU) that controls Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). 
The PLC will activate programs on the robots that will run maintenance and 
replenishment programs.  
The first replenishment program is the home position. After describing the home 
position, it is important to discuss the properties of the robots and their safety systems. 
The robots will position themselves to the home position. The home position is a safe 
position in which no other entities will be in harm‟s way. The robots will have a total of 
seven axes of movement. The robots will be electrically driven and explosion proof.  
The robots will work in groups of four. The four robot configuration will provide 
for full capability in case of the loss of two robots out of four robots. If a third robot fails, 
the system will operate at 60 percent efficiency. If all four robots fail, the system will 
place the RSS in bypass until the system faults are cleared. Because the system will 
utilize swarm methodology, when a RSS unit is down, the adjacent two RSS units will 
protect the downed system with no loss of availability for coverage or response time.  
Each robot will have the ability to move to an applicator station. An applicator is 
the tooling at the end of the robot‟s arm. The end-of-arm tooling will consist of a variety 
of applicators. Examples of some of the applicators are grip and fluid applicators. The 
grip mechanism will function to move the UAV to a fixed known position. The fixed 
known position will allow for less complex tracking of movement. The reduction in 
complexity will reduce the need for motion sensing capability. Another function of the 
grip occurs when a robot faults out and the robot servos lose power. The servo brakes 
will engage. The CPU will activate a set of subroutines. The command ship will be 
monitoring the functions and will manually over-ride operation when necessary. The 
CPU will tell the other robots to hold the failed robot. A second robot will move the robot 
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back to its home. Movement of the downed robot will commence when the first robot 
holds the robot in position. The servo brakes will then be disabled. Once the brakes are 
disabled, the robots can move the failed robot to a safe home position. The CPU will 
place the robot in bypass mode. Bypass mode allows the other robots to go to home and 
function with one less robot during the next cycle instruction.  
Resuming the description of replenishment, a robot will be able to refuel the 
UAV, the USV, and the RSS. One robot can perform the task; however, under normal 
conditions, two robots will perform the task. One or two USVs will be sitting in fixed 
positions inside the four-bay RSS. At least one of the USVs will carry internal tanks 
(industrial 550-gallon totes) like a pickup truck. One robot will approach the 550-gallon 
tote nozzle opening. When the robot touches the nozzle cap on the tote, pneumatic 
controls on the fluid activator will activate the nozzle cap opening. Inside the robot is a 
solvent resistant fluid line that will reach to a second robot. The second robot will 
approach the Fire Scout UAV gas cap. The same process will occur with the second 
robot. Once both robots are in position, a fluid pump connected to the line near the robot 
will pump the fuel from the USV to the UAV. Level controls will tell the system to stop 
the refueling process. Inventory will be recorded on the CPU. The robots will go back to 
the home position. If the next task is different from refueling, the robots will move to the 
applicator station and change to the appropriate applicator. Automation will be described 
in further detail in the technology overview.  
The exploration of operational and supportability scenarios helped the team 
mentally visualize the future state concept. The simulation provided the opportunity to 
observe what happened when a battle space is controlled. The team explored whether a 
mobile platform or fixed platform was feasible and could be used to launch unmanned 
systems that protect high value assets from any threats. An analysis of the different 
platforms concluded that the remote sea station would fit in the ASHC system of systems. 
The simulation, explored in detail later in the report, supports the initial assessment.  
 
3. FMEA Analysis 
Throughout the analytic process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was 
employed to capture the present risks and suggest actions for improvement. This analysis 
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uses a risk prioritization number (RPN) which is the product of the severity of the design 
issues, the probability of occurrence, and the probability of detection. The present state 
RPN was calculated to be 8,266 as compared to the future state RPN of 125. Details of 
the analysis are found in Appendix E. 
 
D. INTERACTION DIAGRAM AND WORK STRUCTURE DIAGRAMS  
The application of the systems engineering methodology led to a generic system 
design as the concept was being developed. This provided the ability to capture those 
components considered essential to the operational concept. Figure 18 communicates the 
hierarchal value system of the components of the Automated Super-Highway Concept. It 
links the critical success factors to the primary components. Level 2 of the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) located in Appendix F lists the primary components. The 
interaction diagram (Appendix H), depicts how the primary components work together as 
a system of systems. These essential components, shown in Figure 19, were combined to 
form an overall work structure diagram providing a pictorial representation of the 
interfaces. The overview work structure diagram is divided into five additional diagrams 






Figure 18.   Fundamental Objectives of Maritime Awareness System. 
   The above diagram is a hierarchical breakdown of the fundamental functions that 
are involved with the maritime awareness. Under the Operational Effectiveness 
level are the four main issues, Area of Coverage, Maritime Security, Presence, and 
Response time. These relate to the issues put forth in the problem statement. 
 





























Figure 19.   Work Structure Overview Diagram. 
   This diagram shows the major sub systems within each individual system.  The 



















































Figure 20.   Key components of Super-Highway concept. 
   The above diagram shows an overview of the key components that make up the 
Super-Highway concept. 
 
E. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
The system concept was developed to meet requirements generated in the 
analysis. This section will present the relevant technologies that flesh out the proposed 
concept.  
 
1. A Review of Requirements 
 
a. Highlights of System 
The proposed system utilizes preventative maintenance to maintain operations 
before failures occur. The maintenance schedule of these systems will be predetermined 
by an FMEA agreement between the supplier and the owner. Minor and medium 
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the supply ship. Spare parts inventory will be tracked on each RSS and on the command 
and supply ships. 
 
b. Highlight of UAV, USV, and RSSs 
The concept of automating lower level controls reduces the complexity of 
controlling multiple unmanned vehicles, as shown in the hierarchy of controls diagram in 
Figure 21.  
 
 
Figure 21.   Hierarchical Control for Multiple Unmanned Vehicles. 
   This block diagram shows the general control scheme for multiple unmanned 


































By reducing the complexity of control larger groups of unmanned vehicles, 
known as swarms, can be formed. A swarm control system allows the UAV, USV, and 
RSS to work together or alone. Swarm control techniques enable graceful degradation of 
performance. The advantage of graceful degradation is that the system of systems can 
continue to operate effectively when a percentage of unmanned systems are down. The 
capability to operate this way enables a higher probability of operational availability of 
the system. Swarm behavior would be implemented in teams of five.  
 
c. Unmanned Systems Roadmap 
The project team focused on capabilities available at the present time. Those 
capabilities were evaluated based on their own strengths and weaknesses (see Figure 22). 
This study did not consider the use of Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (UUVs).  The 




Figure 22.   Platform Deficiencies. 
   Selection of technologies must overcome deficiencies such as power, 




d.  UAV Roadmap Selection 
Understanding the Navy‟s development road map enabled the selection of readily 
available technology needed for our system. In reviewing the current state map of the 
Somalia Pirate process, the project team utilized an unmanned system that closely mimics 
the helicopter. A helicopter is a vertical takeoff system that is traditionally used for these 
missions. When compared with conventional larger helicopters, smaller vertical takeoff 
systems decreased the footprint of the platform needed to support a number of these 
aircraft. The UAV roadmap (Figure 23) communicates the DoD‟s development program 
for each of the armed forces. The Navy portion of the roadmap highlighted in black has 
one vertical takeoff system under development, the Fire Scout.  
 
 
Figure 23.   Existing UAV Platforms. 
   This figure shows some of the current UAV projects that are under development 
and could be used. 
 
e.  USV Roadmap Selection 
By understanding the USV development table (Table 6), which compares a 
number of USVs under development by the Navy, the project team was able to select a 
fleet class (11M or 11 meters in length) USV, which is the largest USV available. The 
larger size is required to replenish systems and to defend HVA and U.S. Naval assets. 
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Table 6.   Comparison Chart of USVs 
   The table below shows a comparison of different types of USVs that are available 
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f. Highlights of Robot System 
Three modes of robot operation were proposed: wait, automatic, and semi-
automatic. During sea state 4 and above the system will be placed in wait mode. Wait 
mode is a mode where the UAVs and up to two USVs are parked inside the RSS. No 
other systems will bring supplies to the RSS during wait mode. The second mode is 
automatic mode. The system will replenish itself automatically. The system will detect 
and respond to intercept potential targets. Once a threat is identified, a series of steps will 
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be activated that will deter the enemy or destroy the enemy. Man-in-the-loop control will 
be used to make the decision to kill. The third mode is a semi-automatic mode where 
overhaul maintenance may be performed along with replenishment of fuel and 
armaments. USVs with diesel fuel totes will park inside the RSS. The robots will attach 
to the totes and transfer the fuel to the UAV, the USV, and the RSS. (Shown in Figure 24 
is a typical explosion proof robot that is used in industry.)  
   
 
Figure 24.   Explosion Proof Robot. 
   This photo shows an explosion proof robot. This type of robot is can be used in 
areas where refueling of vehicles is necessary [Sandia National Laboratories 2003].  
 
The robots are more advantageous than fixed automation systems because of the 
advancement of robotic systems development and the training and support services 
robotics companies offer. In many cases, robotics firms and the customer sign up for 
modular build and an FMEA agreement that specifies the number of hours of operation 
required. “Modular Build” is a pre-installation test process whereby the entire system is 
assembled for operation in the factory, debugged, and run for an agreed amount of time 
under all proposed conditions without causing damage to the system. After the modular 
build is approved, the system is installed in the field. The system is run repeatedly for an 
agreed amount of time. Similar FMEA agreements used in industry help garner free 
robotics support and improvements utilizing FRACAS techniques. FRACAS stands for 
failure reporting and corrective action system. This process improves the product over 
time and holds the robot supplier accountable for operational goals. There are many other 
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replenishment and maintenance processes that can be handled by robots; however, the 
refueling process serves to illustrate the possibilities. Because, the RSS is autonomous, 
the project team can design a smaller footprint system without needing accommodations 
for humans such as bathrooms, wash rooms, kitchens, and living quarters.  
Although the RSS has a smaller footprint, it must still be able defend itself. The 
RSS needs a radar system capable of 48 nm of coverage radius. The system will be 
designed to be compliant with man-in-the-loop operation. The UAVs will provide 
protection when available. If not available a weaponized USV will provide protection. If 
the range to the RSS is too far for defense by the UAV or USV, the RSS will have 
automatic machine gun turrets that will be activated by the man in the loop stationed on 
the command ship. If the automatic turret has malfunctioned, the system will have anti 
tamper capabilities inside the RSS.  
 
g. Highlights of Sensor System 
The primary sensor selected will be an aerostat based multifunction phased array 
radar (MFR) with persistent coverage. The aerostat Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) 
is to be ten years. The aerostat has a significantly lower energy signature due to the use of 
low power density transmit-receive modules embedded in the skin of the aerostat. Figure 




Figure 25.   Conceptual Drawing of ISR Blimp. 
   The above drawing compares surveillance craft being used today to the new 
conceptual ISR Blimp. The new blimp design by DARPA could have reliability 
sufficient for the blimp to last up to 10 years on station.  
 
The MFR is capable of near video resolution imaging of targets of interest. In 
Figure 26 the Radar Cross Sections (RCS) of small maritime targets are displayed. The 
aerostat MFR is based on Lightfoot technology (shown in Figure 27) which is far more 
energy efficient than radars with traditional transmit/receive modules. Figure 28 shows 




Figure 26.   Typical Radar Cross Section (RCS) values. 
   The aerostat has a significantly lower energy signature due to the use of low power density transmit-receive modules embedded in 





Figure 27.   Power Consumption of different Radar technology. 
   This shows what it takes to power various radar systems. The new Lightfoot 
Technology has very low power consumption and a large aperture which allows for 
a larger area of coverage.  
 
 
Figure 28.   Operational Risk. 
   The chart shows the operational risks involved with several different platforms 
that have detection sensors placed on them. The high altitude balloon – aerostat – is 




Sensors will be attached to the UAV, USV, RSS, and aerostat. A diagram of 
coverage is given Figure 29. A radar system will be attached to the RSS and the USV. All 
systems will be able to access information from the aerostat. Speed and range coverage 
for each system are provided below.  
 
 
Figure 29.   OV-1 Range, Duration of Components of Super-Highway Concept. 
   This Figure depicts the range which the components of the Super-Highway 
concept will be able to cover as well as the times that the individual components are 
able to stay on station. 
 
The system will be divided into 200-nm square boxes of coverage. The system 
will be comprised of ten units providing a defended sea lane of 2,000 nm by 200 nm with 
persistent coverage. By confining shipping to a defended area that is only 8 percent of the 






















attacks. Based on a Google earth map (Figure 30) of the Somalia Coast line, ten RSS 
units will be required to cover the sea lanes off the coast of Somalia.  
A typical zone in the Super-Highway will look like the picture shown in  
Figure 31.  
 
 
Figure 30.   Area of Operation of the Somalia Pirates. 
   The area in red shows where the pirates operate. This operational area of the 
pirates covers an estimated 1.2 million square nautical miles. An area that large 






Figure 31.   Super-Highway Concept. 
   The concept of the Super-Highway is to have a high value asset transverse a 
corridor that is 100 nm on either side of a RSS. By staying in this protection zone 
the high value asset will be able to receive assistance from a UAV in a timely 
manner if it were attacked by pirates.  
 
h. Assumptions 
The Super -Highway concept is a virtual space where no entity may enter without 
the system‟s knowledge. A transponder will allow the MOC to monitor each ship. The 
transponder, given to each ship at a check-in point, will allow the MOC to monitor the 
progress of the ship through the super-highway. The transponder is returned at a check-
out point. Its purpose is for positive identification of the ship given permission to travel 
the super-highway. Another reason for issuing the transponder is for it to act as a distress 
signal if the ship is attacked by pirates. A USV transports the transponders according to a 
predetermined schedule. 








These boxes show the area of coverage by  
each individual RSS.















F. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL FOR SIMULATION 
 
1. Analysis of Range 
This analysis was done to determine if it is possible for a potential threat to be 
intercepted and deterred or neutralized by a boat launched from an RSS if it is detected 
100 nm away from an RSS. Three scenarios were analyzed:  
1.  Potential threat moving toward a stationary HVA with an RSS being on 
the other side of the HVA and 100 nm from the point of detection of the 
potential threat (Figure 32).  
2. Potential threat moving in the same direction as a HVA and toward the 
RSS (Figure 33).  
3. Potential threat located 100 nm away from a RSS and 60 nm away from a 
stationary HVA (Figure 35).  
Appendix J is a matrix of the time to intercept given various ranges and speeds.  
 
a. Scenario 1 
A cargo ship carrying multiple shipping containers is located between a potential 
threat, in this case a small speedboat with pirates, and an RSS, seen in Figure 32. The 
threat is detected when it is 100 nm away from the RSS and only 20 nm from the HVA. 
The RSS is initially located 80 nm away from the HVA.  
The speedboat is moving toward the cargo ship at 30 kts, while the RSS launches 
an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) which moves at 40 kts toward the HVA and hence 
the threat. Using Appendix J it can be seen that the pirates in the speedboat will take 
approximately 40 minutes to reach the stationary HVA, while the USV will take 
approximately 120 minutes to reach the HVA. In this scenario, the RSS is determined to 





Figure 32.   Simple Analysis of Time to Intercept. 
   This Figure shows the time for a threat to intercept its target and the time it takes 
for a boat launched from the RSS to intercept the threat. The threat, the boat on the 
left, is moving to the right at 30 knots towards a stationary asset and the RSS is 
located 100 nm from the threat. Once a boat is detected by RSS, it dispatches a boat 
to assess and intercept the detected boat. This boat travels to the left at 40 knots.  
 
b. Scenario 2 
In this case a cargo ship is moving toward an RSS while a potential threat, a small 
speedboat with pirates, is heading toward the cargo ship. The RSS detects the speedboat 
when it is 100 nm away (20 nm from the HVA) and launches a USV to intercept it. 
Figure 33 shows the velocity vectors of the threat, HVA, and the RSS being  
30 kts to the right, 20 kts to the right, and 40 kts to the left, respectively. Since the HVA 
is moving, relative velocities are calculated and used to determine the times to intercept.  
The relative velocity of the threat to the asset is 10 kts, while the relative velocity 
of the boat launched from the RSS to the asset is 60 kts. This means that the threat will 
take 120 minutes to reach the asset and the boat launched from the RSS will only take 80 
minutes to reach the asset. In this scenario, the boat launched from the RSS will have 
enough time to reach and protect the asset from the threat.  
 
File: The hijacked vessel carrying 20 Americans 
is believed to be a Maersk cargo ship, similar to 
one seen in this photo. (Fox News, Wednesday 
April 08, 2009)
Mar. 3: A Somali pirate 
boat is seen in the Gulf 
of Aden off the coast of 
Somalia. (Fox News, 
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Figure 33.   Time to Intercept a Moving Asset. 
   This Figure shows the time for a threat to intercept its target and the time it takes 
for a boat launched from the RSS to intercept the threat. The threat, the boat on the 
left, is moving to the right at 30 knots towards a moving asset and the RSS is located 
100 nm from the threat. Once a boat is detected by RSS, it dispatches a boat to 
assess and intercept the detected boat. This boat travels to the left at 40 knots.  
 
c. Scenarios 1 and 2 Results 
For a stationary asset, an RSS located 80 nm away from the asset, and a threat 
detected 20 nm on the far side of the asset, the asset will not be able to be protected from 
attack (see Figure 32). This means that the RSS needs to be located within 27 nm of the 
asset to provide adequate protection from a threat on the far side of the asset. If the asset 
is not stationary, but moving towards an RSS, then an initial range of 80 nm may be close 
enough to provide adequate protection from a threat on the far side of the asset.  
If a threat is approaching an asset that is moving away from an RSS, the initial 
range of 80 nm of the asset from the RSS will not provide adequate protection from the 
threat. In this case, multiple RSS systems or a faster interceptor vehicle are recommended 
in order to provide the coverage needed to protect the asset.  
Figure 34, shows ranges from an asset that a potential threat should be detected, 
identified, and neutralized. The earlier a threat is detected and intercepted, the higher the 
probability of neutralizing it. The outer circle represents the outer edge of the range (100 
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will take 80 min to reach a 
threat 72 nm away.
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potential threat it detected, identification as friendly or hostile should happen as soon as 
possible. If a potential threat crosses the 40 nm range (first inner circle), a boat (or UAV) 
shall be sent out to warn and intercept if needed. If the potential threat continues on its 
course after being warned, it will be considered hostile and will be engaged. Engagement 
can be either non-lethal or lethal. Once a threat reaches the 20 nm range, and 
consequently the red zone, there is a higher probability of the asset being damaged.  
 
 
Figure 34.   Ranges from an Asset. 
   This Figure depicts the ranges from an asset, within which, a threat needs to be 
detected (outer circle), monitored (all circles), identified as friendly or hostile (first 
inner circle), intercepted (second inner circle), and the threat must be neutralized 
before it reaches the third inner circle.  
 
d. Scenario 3 
A potential threat located 100 nm away from a RSS and 60 nm away from a 
stationary HVA. Figure 35 shows four steps for the threat to reach the HVA. At the first 

















from the HVA. It is moving toward the HVA at 40 kts, which means that at this rate it 
will take 90 min for the threat to reach the HVA. Step two is shown when the threat is 40 
nm away from the HVA and a UAV is launched from the RSS to intercept and deter or 
neutralize the threat. Step three shows the UAV moving at a rate of 100 kts.  At this time, 
it is located 44 nm from the threat, which is 20 nm away from the HVA. Step four shows 
the UAV intercepting the threat before it reaches the 1 nm critical range from the HVA.  
 
 
Figure 35.   Analysis of Time to Intercept a Potential Threat. 
   This figure shows a four step process that the RSS goes through when a threat, 
which is 100 nm from a RSS and 60 nm from a stationary HVA, decides to go after 
the HVA. 
 
2. Modeling and Simulation 
During the simulation process, a model was created and various simulations were 
performed by varying inputs in a functional and systematic method for each alternative. 
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alternatives to provide stakeholders with recommendations for selecting the best 
alternative. 
 
a. Process  
The modeling and simulation process, shown in Figure 36, involved seven steps: 
generating scenarios, selecting the modeling tool, choosing evaluation measures, making 
assumptions, building the models, running the simulations, and analyzing the results. The 
seven steps are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Modeling and Simulation Process. 
   This Figure shows the seven steps in the modeling and simulation process. The 
final result from this process is used in the analysis of alternatives to provide the 
stakeholders with a recommendation for accepting the best alternative studied. 
 
b. Scenario Overview 
Figure 37 and Figure 38 are based on the current state and future state maps 
presented earlier. The earlier Figure 13 and Figure 14 were used in a Lean process to 
show areas where waste could be eliminated in the process. Here, they provide the basis 



















operations that are occurring around the Horn of Africa in the prevention of pirate attacks 
on merchant vessels. In this area of operation, there are warships that are on patrol 
searching for possible threats to merchant vessels or Mayday calls for help. Once a 
potential threat is observed or a Mayday call is received, the warship will launch a 
helicopter, change heading to intercept threat, and launch the boarding craft with armed 
personnel. This is all dependent upon the distance that the warship is from the threat. If 
the threat is too far away, only the helicopter will be used to intercept the threat. When 
the threat can be reached by a boarding party craft before it reaches the merchant vessel, 
the boarding parties will perform a search and seizure of the suspected pirate vessel.  
 
 
Figure 37.   Current State Map. 
   This is the current state map of operations for the warships on patrol around the 
Horn of Africa and the basis of one simulation scenario that can be compared to the 
future state scenario. 
 
The second scenario is a variation of the first scenario. This scenario incorporates 
two UAVs that can be launched from the patrolling warship. By performing this variation 
of the scenario the project team was able to get a better comparison between the warship 




































The third scenario was developed based on the future state map (Figure 38). The 
future state map is based on the RSS and operations similar to those of the warships 
presently patrolling around the Horn of Africa. The big difference in this scenario is that 
the project team condensed the battle space by offering a two hundred nautical mile wide 
safe zone shipping lane. Any vessel that wishes to transverse this shipping lane is under 
the protection of the ASHC, consisting of a series of individual RSSs, which carry three 
UAVs each. In this scenario, a merchant vessel enters the protected shipping lane and if 
there is any adversary that attempts to attack the merchant vessel, a UAV is launched 
from the RSS. The UAV then proceeds to intercept and stop the adversary from any 
aggressive actions against the merchant vessel. Simulation of this scenario can contribute 
to the identification of factors that may affect the RSSs ability to protect merchant vessels 
off the coast of Somalia. 
 
 
Figure 38.   Future State Map. 
   The future state map shows the operations of the RSS. Compared to the current 
state map, the future state map has three fewer steps. Three steps have been 
eliminated as a result of the autonomous operations of the RSS. 
 
c. Tool Selection 
Selection of the right modeling and simulation tool is critical to the outcome of 






















disadvantages, and limitations. Another consideration that was taken into account was 
learning how to use the new tool. Therefore, since the project team was already familiar 
with the operations of ARENA and EXCEL, these two were under consideration to be 
used. The project team also looked at SIMIO, CRYSTAL BALL, MATLAB, and 
MINITAB. ARENA, SIMIO, and MATLAB, are able to model almost any system or 
process. Because MATLAB is matrix based, and most of the team members were not 
proficient using this tool the project team decided to eliminate it. Both ARENA and 
SIMIO are object-orientated and easier to use. Their dynamic modeling capabilities were 
able to be utilized to help answer questions on how an existing or a proposed system will 
perform. The project team decided to use SIMIO in preference to ARENA because 
SIMIO had better graphics and extended capabilities that were not available in ARENA. 
EXCEL, CRYSTAL BALL, and MINITAB were considered for the final analysis of the 
data that was collected from the simulations. EXCEL was eliminated because its 
statistical add-in package is not reliable in some statistical calculations, which in turn 
could lead to unreliable analysis of the data. In the end, the project team chose 
CRYSTAL BALL for the response analysis and MINITAB for the statistical analysis. 
 
d. Evaluation Measures for Modeling and Simulation 
The main focus of modeling and simulation was to evaluate the systems to protect 
a high value asset from unfriendly adversaries. For the system to be able to perform the 
main objective the system must be able to achieve the following: detect friendly and foe 
vessels in the area of coverage; have an asset available to intercept a foe; have the ability 
of the asset intercepting the foe; and have the ability for the asset to stop the foe. This 
emphasizes two major metrics: distance of the asset to the target and the relative speed 
between the target and asset.  
Since the scenario for each of the alternatives was unchanged and only the 
platforms were changed, the project team was able to use the same metrics to measure the 
performance of each individual platform. This allowed the project team to collect similar 
data in each of the simulations and compare data obtained from several runs of the 
simulation. Once this data was collected, statistical analysis was performed and the 





It is assumed that the available assets, helicopters and UAVs, will be able to 
engage the enemy out to a 100 nm radius from any platform carrying these types of 
assets. The detection of all vessels in the area is equal to or greater than the 100 nm 
radius from the platform. The earlier a hostile threat is determined, the higher the 
probability of a neutralizing it. Radar will be monitoring and tracking all vessels in the 
area. All tactical information is being seen at the MOCs. All systems are using C4I 
capabilities such as LINK-16 and satellite communications.  
Key modeling and simulation objectives were to determine the number of 
successful aggressive adversaries that were intercepted and either deterred or neutralized, 
thus preventing an attack on a high value asset, i.e. merchant vessel.  
 
3. Generic Model Description 
The decision making process in the model was built on the basis of a kill chain. 
This kill chain consists of three components: detect, control, and engage. The kill chain 
was adopted to establish a clear set of functions that the system of systems must perform. 
The purpose of the model was to demonstrate and quantify how effectively the candidate 
architectures performed the kill chain throughout the detect/control/engage sequence for 
each alternative.  
 
a. Detect 
The first phase of the kill chain is detection. In all models, which were developed 
in SIMIO, it was assumed that all vessels were detectable and that there was a random 
probability that some of these vessels would chase a HVA. These vessels would then be 
monitored to determine if they were vectoring towards the high value asset. If it was 
deemed that the craft was bearing down on the high value asset and crossed a 20 nm zone 
nearing the high value asset, then the closest platform will launch a helicopter or UAV 
(depending on whether it is a warship or an RSS). The generic detection section of the 





Figure 39.   Detect Section of Model (Generic). 
   This Figure shows the generic detection concept used in the model. The inputs and 




As indicated earlier, the baseline model was developed in SIMIO and only slight 
changes were made to this baseline in order to depict different scenarios. In the control 
phase of the kill chain, a probability value was selected to determine whether the 
interception of the aggressor was successful or not. This is the part of control in which 
the helicopter or UAV intercepts the aggressor and determines the intent of the aggressor. 
At this point there are two likely outcomes from this encounter. The first is that the 
aggressor does not take the risk and will disengage from its hostile behavior. If this 
occurs, the interceptor will loiter in the area to ensure the aggressor does not reengage the 
HVA. The second outcome is that the aggressor continues on its course to attack the 
HVA. When this takes place, the intercept asset will switch to the engage mode. Figure 
40 illustrates a generic control model. 
Contact Reports  from all  Platforms 
Processed at  Command Platform 
and MOC





Figure 40.   Control Section of Model (Generic). 
   This is a generic representation of the control element once a hostile aggressor is 
intercepted by either a helicopter or UAV via man in the loop. The interceptor 
determines the intent of the target and issues a warning of engagement if aggressive 
behavior is continued. 
 
c. Engagement 
The engagement phase of the model simulates how a typical weapon engagement 
is executed and provides outputs to the rest of the kill chain. Steps in the weapon 
engagement phase were: receive weapons tasking, launch a weapon, guide weapon to 
target, provide weapons inventory, and provide a kill evaluation of the target track. The 
project team simplified this to make the system model less complicated. The project team 
also assumed that the weapon engagement could be either non-lethal or lethal. Some 
examples of non-lethal weapons that could be used are acoustic, radio frequency, and 
microwave radiation. Once a “weapons free” command has been given, the interceptor 
would have the ability to neutralize the hostile aggressor by whatever means available. 
This means that either the aggressor would disengage from the attack on the high value 
asset or the aggressor would be eliminated. After the aggressor was neutralized, the 
interceptor would loiter in the area and provide visual feedback to the MOC confirming 
that the aggressor was stopped its pursuit of the HVA. The project team was only 
concerned with neutralization of the target (threat to HVA) in order to keep the modeling 
within the scope of the project. The inputs and outputs of the engagement portion are 
shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41.   Engage Section of Model (Generic). 
   This Figure shows the simplified input and output of the engagement phase. The 
weapons tasking is received from the control platform. The tasks are interpreted 
and weapon engagement is commenced, followed by visual confirmation of kill or no 
kill. 
 
The weapon type to be used was chosen based on the target‟s intent and the 
perceived aggressiveness of the target. The preferred weapon selected depends on the 
complement of weapons available on the defending platform. The orders of the MOC and 
rules of engagement must be followed. Lastly, there must be a confirmation of the 
neutralization of the target and evidence of a kill or no kill. 
 
4. Modeling Alternatives 
All three alternatives used the same baseline model so that all of the alternatives 
could be rated under the same criteria. The alternatives differed from each other in terms 
of platform distances to the HVA, speed, and availability of helicopters or UAVs. 
Furthermore, for the model to represent a realistic environment, random normal 
distribution generators were inserted into the simulation for: the number of high value 
assets, the number of hostile aggressors (pirates) attacking high value assets, and the 
number of successful intercepts and kills.  
 
a. SIMIO Analysis 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) contributed to the development of the Concepts 
of Operation (CONOPS). Essentially, M&S allowed operational performance to be 
assessed while analyzing performance parameters. M&S also allowed the project team to 











Furthermore, the project team was able to predict the target area of coverage, and the 
required response times. 
Figure 42 (page 78) represents one run of the SIMIO model with the HVA 
defended with a warship with one UAV. The numbers next to each block represent the 
number of entities that depart from the block. (Actual screen shots of the SIMIO 
simulation are in Appendix I)  
The radar is able to „ignore‟ friendly targets, and only track potential threats. The 
friendly assets move to the Ignore block, while the potential threats move to the Loiter 1 
block where they are paired with an asset. This pairing allows the model to represent the 
potential threat locking in on an asset and pursuing it. Once the potential threat 
determines it wants to continue pursuing the asset, the pair moves to either Separator 3, 
where the asset is determined not be of value to the potential threat, or to Range 20 nm, 
where the threat determines the asset to be a HVA. When the threat starts pursuing an 
asset, the warship receives a signal, which in turn causes it to prepare the UAV for 
launch. The UAV is sent to meet the enemy at Loiter 3 and the sequence of deterring the 
threat has begun.  
 
i. Scenario 1: Warship with one UAV 
In this run of the scenario, 152 potential threats combined with an asset and 
moved through the Enemy Chasing HVA block. Seventy-eight threats were determined 
not to be of interest and 74 threats were determined to be HVA. Out of the 74 cases with 
enemies pursuing a HVA, only 69 could be met by a UAV. This means that in 
approximately 7 percent of the cases, a HVA could be attacked before the UAV could get 
there to intercept and deter the enemy. Once the threat was met by the UAV, it was able 





Figure 42.   SIMIO Model - Warship with one UAV. 
   This figure represents one run of the model simulating an HVA defended by a warship with one UAV. 
79 
 
ii. Scenario 2: Warship with two UAVs 
Scenario 2, seen in Figure 43 (page 80), has two UAVs able to be launched when 
a potential threat is detected pursuing an asset. One hundred twenty-six potential threats 
are combined with an asset and move on to the Enemy Chasing UAV block. From here, 
54 are determined to be of little interest and 72 are pursued further. Out of the 72 threats 
pursuing an asset, 68 are able to be met by a UAV. While there is a slightly higher 
probability of an UAV intercepting the threat than scenario 1, there are still enemies that 
can attack an asset before help is able to arrive. Out of the threats that are intercepted, 
92.6 percent are able to be deterred while 7.4 percent are destroyed.  
 
iii. Scenario 3: RSS with two UAVs 
The scenario with the two UAVs and a RSS shown in Figure 44 (page 81) is 
much like the two UAVs with a warship; however, the UAVs are able to return to the 
RSS and be prepared for re-launch faster than on the warship. The difference between the 
two scenarios is a controlled battle space where the RSS operates within design 
capabilities. One hundred thirty-eight potential threats are combined with assets and 
move on to the Enemy Chasing HVA block. Out of the 138 assets, 75 are determined to 
be of interest. The Loiter 3 block shows 75 enemies combined with UAVs departing to 
the intercept block. This means that a UAV is able to reach every threat that continues 
pursuing an asset. Out of the threats that are intercepted, 96 percent are able to be 




Figure 43.   SIMIO Model - Warship with Two UAVs. 




Figure 44.   SIMIO model - RSS with Two UAVs. 
   In this figure UAVs are able to return and be prepared for re-launch faster than on the warship. 
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b. CRYSTAL BALL and MINITAB Analysis 
The SIMIO simulation was able to visually show when the UAV could not 
intercept the enemy; however, the SIMIO software did not generate a distribution that 
could be evaluated in an ovelay chart or be used in a sensitivity analysis. CRYSTAL 
BALL software has overlay charts and sensitivity analysis charts built in. An overlay 
chart allows several distributions to be compared. For example, overlays of response time 
can show when two distributions overlap. This information can reveal when one response 
is better than another. The comparison leads to the selection of the best option. A 
sensitivity chart displays which process step affects the response the most. The sensitivity 
of an outcome to contributing factors can be easily interpreted when measures are 
presented in a Pareto chart (Appendix K). A step with a low magnitude means that the 
step has little effect on the process. A step with a large magnitude means that the step has 
a significant effect on the process. In summary, CRYSTAL BALL analysis allows the 
team to make conclusions quickly with less effort than SIMIO. 
 
i. MINITAB Box Plot Analysis 
CRYSTAL BALL was used to generate one thousand system response time 
outcomes for each scenario. The project team used triangular distributions to simulate the 
response time of the vessels and UAVs. The CRYSTAL BALL results were then 
imported into MINITAB. Next, a spreadsheet was developed to compare the response 
time for each platform. The first plots that the project team derived from the analysis 
were the Box Plots, shown in Figure 45.  
These plots show that Warships had the worst response time. Response time for 
the warship and RSS means the time from detection of threat until a UAV, from either 
the warship or RSS, intercepts the threat. Enemy response time means time from 
detection of threat until it reaches the HVA. Response time for the HVA means time from 
detecting threat until threat over takes the HVA. The plots show very little overlap with 
the HVA and enemy elements, meaning the warship with either one UAV or two UAVs 
may not intercept the enemy in time. In other words, using a warship to patrol for pirates 
and protect a HVA is not very effective. In essence the warship is most likely to fail at its 
tasking. When the project team looked at the box plot for the RSS, it was clear that it was 
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the lowest value of any result. This indicates that the RSS is most likely to provide 
adequate protection to all the HVAs while also being able to engage every enemy. The 
data shown here gives strong indication that the RSS system is more efficent with a 
higher probability at protecting the HVAs.  
 
 
Figure 45.   Box Plot from MINITAB. 
   This is the box plot from the MINITAB analysis. The Y axis represents minutes of 
response time. The X axis provides the names of the primary simulation elements. It 
shows how there is very little overlap with the warships and HVA and enemy. While 
the RSS has the lowest value of all, meaning that the RSS has the higher probability 
of protecting the HVAs. Enemy, HVA, RSS, Warship, and Warship 2 are all 
statistically different (see Appendix M). Therefore the intepretation for the Box 
Plots can be intepretated graphically. 
 
ii. Confidence Interval Plot 
Next the project team performed a 95-percent confidence interval analysis on the 
results obtained from the CRYSTAL BALL simulation runs. This analysis depicts the 
variation from the mean. Comparing this plot, shown in Figure 46 and the Box Plot 
Figure above, you will notice that the bigger the box in the box plot the wider the 














Box Plot of Response
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performance of the RSS and once again emphasizing the fact that the RSS is more 
capable of protecting the HVA form the enemy or any aggressive adversary.  
 
Figure 46.   95 Percent Confidence Interval Plot. 
   The above confidence interval plot shows the variation from the mean for each of 
the platfroms in the simulation. This once again shows how the warships have the 
largest variation from the mean, thus the least consistant performance of the 
platforms.  
 
iii. Overlay Chart 
The overlay chart shown in Figure 47 is a summary of the results obtained from 
running the CRYSTAL BALL simulation. This puts all the relevant information in an 
easy-to-see format for intepretation of the results. The results indicated that the warships 
have about a ten percent chance of missing the enemy. When looking at the HVA and 
enemy information one sees that the enemy will over take the HVA about thirty percent 
of the time. When the RSS stands alone and ahead of the HVA and enemy the RSS will 













Interval Plot of Enemy, HVA, RSS, Warship, Warship 2





Figure 47.   CRYSTAL BALL Overlay Chart (Response Time). 
   The overlay chart is a summary of the data results for a run of 1,000 trials.  The X 
axis represents minutes and the Y axis represents relative frequency of event times. 
It shows that the RSS has the ability to intercept the enemy 100 percent of the time. 
Whereas the warships will only be able to intercept the enemy about 90 percent of 





Within a six-month period, pirate attacks have increased from 78 attacks to 146 
attacks. Combined Task Force 151 has increased naval presence from 20 ships to 30 
ships [Naval War College 2009]. Yet, it is clear that the piracy problem is not being 
solved by the conventional means being employed today.  
This paper proposes a concept that utilizes one command ship with Remote Sea 
Stations (RSSs) and UAVs instead of the 30 ships making up Combined Task Force 151. 
In addition to reducing the number of ships, the number of personnel involved would also 
be dramatically reduced. A comparison of the concepts discussed in this report is shown 
in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.   Overview across Platforms. 
 
 
The reduction in resources of manpower and number of ships to support the 
maritime security problem is a compelling reason to employ a system developed with an 
Automated Super-Highway Concept (ASHC). The Automated Super-Highway Concept 
approach is to control the battle space, which will limit the patrol area. Within the ASHC, 
the system would divert or destroy all non-friendly entities that do not belong in our 
defined battle space. The technology selected for the system allows for 100 percent 
availability when a single system or component fails. This system takes advantage of the 
graceful degradation provided by use of phased array technology. Graceful degradation is 




Autonomous Sea base 10 0 0
UAV's / Helicopters 30 21 30
Resupply Needed 1 1 1
USV's 10 0 0
Naval Manpower 65 2100 9000
War Ships 1 7 30
Boarding Party 0 7 30
Aerostats 3 0 0
Effectiveness Constant Presence More Capable Less Capable
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system employs a new concept for automated refuel, rearmament, and routine 
maintenance of unmanned systems by unmanned systems. Finally, a remote sea station is 
significantly less costly to build and maintain. The entire concept is depicted in the 
Operations View (OV-1) shown in Figure 48. 
 
 
Figure 48.   OV-1 of the Super-Highway Concept CONOPS. 
   This figure shows the CONOPS of the Super-Highway Concept which will allow 
for a safe area of operation for a vessel that chooses to travel via the controlled 
battle space. The controlled area will be monitored closely and if a possible threat 
wanders into the controlled area it will be intercepted by the UAVs. 
 
The concept represents an architecture that provides a solution to the four critical 
success factors of the problem statement. The first factor required the establishment of a 
naval presence in remote locations so that naval forces have proximity to the areas 
needing improved maritime security and can gain superior intelligence of enemies. The 
second factor is area of coverage. Limiting the area within which the enemy of maritime 
security engages our forces leads to effective area coverage by limited resources in 




















remote locations. The third factor is response time. Naval forces must be prepared to 
engage the enemy before the enemy of maritime security can become an undeterred 
threat. The fourth factor is the role of maritime security. Our forces and systems must be 
designed for effective engagement of enemies of maritime security.  
Development of the ASHC and its related systems as presented in this paper could 
provide a viable solution to the problem. Analysis indicates that this solution was able to 
address and resolve all of the issues in the problem statement. Implementing this solution 
would allow larger warships to respond to threats elsewhere in the world, while the 
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The objective of the Team 3 capstone project is to apply a systems engineering 
approach to explore concepts for Augmenting Naval Capabilities in Remote Sea 
Locations (ANCRSL). The goal of applying this approach is to build and strengthen 
each team member‟s ability to conduct high level engineering design, architecture, and 
analysis. The systems engineering approach will provide an analysis of multiple effective 
solutions with a goal to select the optimal solution or solutions that will augment naval 
assets in remote locations. Due to increasing challenges related to complexity, cost, and 
timing, the next generation of systems engineering practitioners must put more effort into 
finding failure modes early and implement effective counter measures. By utilizing sound 
systems engineering practices, we aim our efforts at providing valuable insight into the 
process of developing new technology. A secondary objective is that the capstone project 
may provide a solution to the problem, which may contribute to the performance of the 




The nature of the enemy has changed dramatically since the end of the cold war. 
Navy planning efforts to secure the maritime domain are improving. However successful 
these efforts are, the efforts are not adequate for present maritime security needs. The 
Navy paradigm of once battling only large nation navies is shifting to combating the 
emerging maritime threats and the challenges posed by non-state groups engaged in 
unconventional attacks on maritime commerce. Two key issues in the headlines today are 
maritime domain awareness and piracy. The Navy‟s paradigm shift to respond to 
maritime domain awareness and piracy threats must include an equitable responsive 
scalable combat force.  
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The recently issued Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power (Conway 
2007) reflects an institutional response to the United States‟ changed strategic 
circumstances. Moreover, the document embodies a logic that suggests a significant 
change to the Navy force structure paradigm. A naval force paradigm is a theory of how 
to organize various ships and weapons available to the navy for warfare. Naval War 
College studies suggest that Navy forces should adopt a different style of war fighting for 
some scenarios. The new force paradigm communicates the need for a more spread out 
and more flowing war-fighter force. The needed force structure is different from the 
existing orientation of defensive bastions around sea bases of Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSGs) or Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs). Thus, the access-denial problem is 
fundamentally different in the Persian Gulf from what it is in Northeast Asia. These 
regions of fundamental differences suggest that the Navy should tailor its force by 
geographical region and mission area. Furthermore, studies suggest that the Navy does 







Figure 49.   An Analysis of Pirate Actions and Responses from January - February 
2009. 
   The fishbone analysis examines the reasons contributing to the Somalia Piracy 
threat to Maritime Security from the perspective of enemy equipment, the enemy, 
the United States Navy, maritime trade, allied equipment and the victims. The 
analysis reveals those reasons that contribute to the spread of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia.  
  
In 2009, the broadcasts on CNN have amplified the existence of the changing 
paradigm in which small unlawful groups known as pirates have successfully impacted 
maritime security. In contrast, our response to the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia 
is to form a multi-coalition naval force of the richest martime nations in the world. 
Despite the formation of a multi-coalition naval force, martime security is still threatened 
by Somalian pirate activities. An analysis of the root cause of the breach in martime 
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security off the coast of Somalia is examined and the results are displayed in Figure 49. 
The fishbone diagram attempts to reveal the primary reasons for the existence of a 
thriving pirate operation resulting in 78 ship attacks, 19 hijacked ships, 16 acquired ships, 
and 300 hostages taken within a 60 day period (Kennedy 2009). The fishbone analysis 
reveals that the defender does not have the capability to cover the large remote area. 
Also, the fishbone analysis supports a conclusion that the pirate attacks were successful 




As the US Navy steams ahead into the 21st century, it becomes apparent that it 
faces two potential problems. The first problem is the changing roles and missions that 
the navy is being tasked to do. These new roles and tasks will require a force structure 
change that will significantly impact the composition of the future navy. Today's navy is 
a power projection force equipped to do battle on the open ocean. The future navy must 
evolve from “blue water” fighting to littoral combat with smaller aggressors. Although 
the concept of littoral combat is still being defined, good examples of this include current 
missions such as anti-piracy and drug enforcement. Secondly, today's navy is at a low 
ebb with the number of ships in service. This translates to a lack of US Naval presence in 
areas such as the Horn of Africa. The increase in pirate activity in this area has put a 
taxing toll on the existing force structure of the navy. Overall, these two problems present 
a unique set of requirements for the future navy. It is clear that innovative solutions are 
needed to relieve the pressure off the current force structure, and which provide the 
presence needed to respond to conflict in a timely manner. This project will investigate 
potential solutions to the problems above. 
 
Mission Needs Analysis 
 
The scope and complexity of military missions must compete with the need to 
reduce development, deployment, and recurrent costs of supporting systems. As a result, 
systems engineers must perform multiple levels of mission analysis and develop 
associated concepts of operation to strengthen the value of systems used to support 
military missions. Mission needs analysis and the development of concepts of operation 
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will bridge the gap between the user‟s operational needs and the technical specifications 
needed to provide the best solutions to the war fighter. As a basis in which to begin 
analysis of the problem we have defined, the team has developed a notional list of 
requirements for our problem listed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8.   Notional Requirements. 
Performance Parameter Development Threshold Development Objective 
Availability 
24 x 7 for 90 Days, 
System deployment to operational 
area within 20 days 
Same as Threshold 
Coverage 
Each Sea-Base provide 
persistence coverage within 200 
NM radius 
 400 nm + 
Interoperability  
Link 11, 12, & 16 compatibility, + 
all military satellite, + secure 
wireless. All systems JTIC 
certified    
Interoperability with NATO, & Coalition 
Lethality Ability to disable/destroy, small-medium size targets 
A controlled   disability/destruction 
capability synchronized with target 
discrimination. 
Survivability   
System will operate in Sea-State 
5. System is capable of full 
operation in all operational areas 
particularly tropics). System will 
defend against irregular forces. 
For example, such forces are 
small fast boats or small fast 
attack craft. 
Ability to operate in all states the enemy is 
capable of operation. 
 
Manning 
Extensive use of automation to 
reduce personnel manning & to 
reduce logistical footprint 
To minimize the systems footprint in 
proportion to the discriminated threat 
C2 
Ensure man in the loop (links to 
HQ), and prevent 
fratricide/civilian casualties (rules 
of engagement/CONOPS)  
Full automatic and semi-automatic operation 
with man in loop at safe remote location 
Reaction time Arrive on area of interest 15 minutes after notification.  
Arrive on area of interest with 99% 
confidence interval of detection of hostile 
intent 
 
To accomplish this needs analysis our team used the following tools and 
techniques to define the problem:  
 System Decomposition  
 Functional Analysis  
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 Futures Analysis  
 
The needs statement is as follows:  
Friendly forces require the rapid response capability to prevent smaller 
adversaries from attacking (delivering ordnance of any kind) against naval/ 
commercial vessels, critical ports, or offshore installations in remote locations.  
 
This is our point of entry into our needs analysis. The following sections provide 
justification of our thought process on the design and development of a system to prevent 
enemies from delivering ordnance against friendly maritime assets/shore facilities. The 
focus of our effort was on the prevention of ordnance delivery specific to enemy small-
medium size vessels/boats. Due to problem complexity, we used an Affinity Diagram 
approach, seen in Figure 50, to collect thoughts and ideas related to the initial problem 
statement. The inputs are in functional categories. The inputs in the center below may 
keep the forces safe but fail to prevent the actual delivery function of the ordnance. 
The headers of detect and engage both jumped out as important elements for 
consideration in our system while seeking to fully understand the initial problem. Joint 
interoperability of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment is the basis of the analysis of the 
initial problem. The team chose to include this functional C4ISR area in our 
decomposition process. C4ISR functions will play a key role to exchanging information 
important to our problem set. Likewise, we understand that before preventing an 
aggressive action, we need to detect the threat first. Early detection is critical to maritime 
safety, and our assets must ensure responsive and continuous C4ISR procedures to shape 





Figure 50.   Affinity Diagram to develop functions to prevent delivery of ordnance. 
   Affinity Analysis facilitates participative brainstorming. After the initial session, 
similar ideas are grouped together to develop common themes. Those common 
themes are Detect, Control, and Engage. 
 
Ways of detecting enemy vessels include line of sight (LOS) and using signatures. 
Signatures (e.g., electronic, thermal, acoustic, etc.) help to extend visual detection to 
beyond line of sight (BLOS) ranges. Improved BLOS ranges can be achieved through 
sensor elevation (e.g., higher terrain, aerial platform, satellite) or by taking advantage of 
the enemy‟s own platform signatures and physical features (e.g., engine, on board 
communications, reflective properties, existing surface areas, thermal properties, and 
platform movement). 
In summary, the mission needs analysis investigates three interoperating system 
groups working together to address the problem. These include Detection, C4ISR, and 
Engagement systems (Detect, Control, and Engage). 
 
Highlights of Systems Engineering Approach 
 
Standard Systems Engineering Methodology coupled with a Design for Lean Six 
Sigma focus will define the approach executed by our team. Due to increasing challenges 
related to complexity, cost, and timing, our engineering approach will focus on finding 
failure modes early and implementing effective counter measures. Five possible failure 
modes are unintended function, intermittent function, over/under performance, and no 
function. The process for refining our design by eliminating failure modes is in the 





Figure 51.   Notional Team Roadmap. 
   The notional team roadmap represents a plan to execute a tailored systems 
engineering approach. Each color code corresponds to the team role and concurrent 
technical role. Each team role possesses a swim lane. Within each team role, related 
process blocks exist in assigned swim lanes. Team interaction between members 
occurs in swim lanes, between swim lanes, and by color code. Deliverables and 




Within the roadmap is the Design for Lean Six Sigma (DFLSS) tools concepts 
exploration function block. Concepts exploration involves examining the product 
development system consisting of a six step DFLSS tool process incorporated within 
three product development phases: Product Design and Definition, Manufacturing 
Process and Development, and Customer Deployment shown in Figure 52. This approach 
is similar to the spiral engineering process with each phase building upon the previous 
phase and repeating the process. In Figure 52, the hexagon labeled “A” refers to the 
DFLSS tool process repeated throughout each of the product development phases. 
Reference A is also the link between the “V” Diagram and the iterative product 
development systems engineering process. 
 
 
Figure 52.   Product Development Systems Engineering Approach. 
   The product development systems engineering approach considers the entire life 
cycle of the product. Within each phase of product life cycle are three concern 
functions. Each function is analyzed using subroutine A. Subroutine A represents 
the development process in the “V” Diagram. The subroutine consists of concept 




A DFLSS tools approach will complement the standard systems engineering 
approach. The DFLSS tools method presented at the Department of the Navy 2007 
Continuous Process Improvement Symposium is an enabler for concept development. 
The concept development process is a combination of DCOV (Define, Characterize, 
Optimize, and Validate) and DMEDI (Define, Modify, Explore, Design, Implement) 
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DFLSS tools methods. The DFLSS tools process will apply many tools taught within the 
systems engineering program at the Naval Postgraduate School. One area where DFLSS 
tools will help is requirements generation. The Supplier, Input, Process, Output, and 
Customer (SIPOC) and the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) are tools that determine 
the voice of the customer.  
 
 
Figure 53.   Voice of the Customer and Requirements Generation: Concept Design 
Phase 
   The requirements generation process starts with a 10,000-foot view SIPOC. Next, 
“Critical to X” characteristics (CTXs) from the SIPOC provide input to the process 
blocks of the 1000 ft view SIPOC. CTXs of the 1000 foot SIPOC provide input to the 
customer needs block of the 100-foot view QFD. The QFD examines the different 







A generic system design results from the development of a base-level functional 
flow system of standard capability. The functional structure extends the idea of boundary 
diagrams to capture functional flows between multiple functions/elements of an entire 
system or product. Functional structures add physical, architecture, and interface 
information beyond other methods. The properties of the functional structures include the 
ability to show a clear and specific relationship to customer use scenarios; the second 
property represents parallel and sequential functional relationships; the third property 
represents a clear system boundary; the fourth property describes a system in terms of 
input-output relationships independent of form. A functional flow structure shows the 
movement of materials, energies, and signals (information) through the boundaries of the 
product/system. Functional flow diagrams provide a concrete way to translate qualitative 
functions into quantitative transfer functions in complex systems.  
  
Application Specific Design 
 
Application specific design starts at the component level and progresses to the 
function level. The application specific design represents a new future state. 
Corresponding to each state is a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) analysis. 
The FMEA analysis calculates a risk prioritization number (RPN), a measurement of risk. 
Each future state possesses a calculated RPN number that we compare with the ideal state 
RPN number and the current state RPN number. The application specific design 
continues to improve on the RPN number until the customer and engineers agree on risk 





Figure 54.   “V” process integrated with the gatekeeper process.  
   This figure shows the correlation between the Systems Engineering „V‟ approach 
(green), the gatekeeper process (red), and the Design, Characterize, Optimize, 
Verify (DCOV) Lean Six Sigma process (blue). The Function, Subsystem, and 




The organization of the team is critical to the implementation of the systems 
engineering approach. The team organization must incorporate the concepts of a learning 
organization and innovative product development environment in which both concepts 
contribute to accelerate product development. The organization must foster a learning 
environment, which will emphasize mentorship and guidance in the form of our 
professors from the Naval Postgraduate School. The learning organization will tap into 
the technical resources of hull design, sensor development, and unmanned development.  
Knowing DFLSS tool applications will accelerate the learning organization, half 
the team took Lean Six Sigma Green belt training. Also important to the project is 
management buy-in. The learning organization obtains management buy-in through 
approval of calling the Capstone Project an organization sponsored lean project.  
In Figure 56, the organization achieves level three, stage three standards to control 
innovative development. Next in Figure 58, the process includes a Gatekeeper process. 
The Gatekeeper Process is a self-validating process that allows project progression to 
continue when a set of milestone entrance and exit criteria are achieved. Figure 56 and 
Figure 58 represent some Lean Six Sigma concepts, which are part of our systems 
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engineering approach. Another concept of Lean Six Sigma is the Kanban approach. The 
Kanban method allows momentary stoppages in the product development process when 
agreed to requirements are not satisfied. When the Kanban process receives information 
to stop the process, the team must resolve the design stoppage immediately. This action is 
a “Kaizen Blitz”, which places emphasis on the ability to reflect carefully and act 
quickly. All three of these concepts must work together to be effective.  
 
 
Figure 55.   Project Organization. 
   Development of the learning organization will bind the stakeholders to the 
process. Acceleration of the systems engineering process occurs when the majority 
of the team understands Lean-Six Methodology. The Learning Organization 






Figure 56.   Innovative Team and Product Development. 
   Development of the innovative organization in the beginning instills an 
evolutionary and robust product focus in the early stages of the systems engineering 
approach. The yellow boxes indicate segments implemented by the team. Two 
concepts that need implementation yet are the “Balanced Scorecard” and “What by 






Each person on the team has a dual role. The dual role contains the team 
member‟s expertise and team assignment. The professional background of the team 
member determines their expertise role. The team leader determines the assignment. The 
assignments consist of a leader, a deputy leader, a scheduler, a librarian (configuration 
manager), and modeler.  
Leader 
The primary responsibility of the team leader is to facilitate the overall 
coordination of the project. This includes being the chair of team meetings, preparing the 
agenda, reviewing the schedule, getting collaboration on issues, reaching decisions, 
assigning action items with due dates, and managing the project risks.  
 
Deputy Leader 
The deputy leader will function as a general field manager enforcing policy set by 
the leader and perform the leader‟s function in his absence.  
 
Scheduler 
The scheduler will be responsible for developing project schedules and tracking 
group progress versus planned due dates. The scheduler will provide the status of group 
performance in meeting timelines. 
 
Librarian (Configuration Manager) 
The librarian will also be the configuration manager and responsible for keeping a 
complete audit trail of decisions, design modifications, and documented changes. This 
includes gathering and cataloguing all reference material provided by the team. The 
configuration manager will also be responsible for version control of all project 
documentation including the final report and briefing packages.  
 
Editor 
The editor shall be responsible for the editorial aspects of the report, which 
include reviewing, rewriting, and editing the work of teammates.  Other responsibilities 
are formatting, spelling, grammar checking, and making the report a cohesive document. 
The editor will collect, merge, and render the final editorial decision on each submission. 
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The editor‟s job will also include verifying the correct format of all citations and 
references. Due to the complexity of the editorial process, it is imperative that the editor 
communicate directly with the author and the rest of the team.  
 
Modeler 
The modeler will be responsible for the development of a life cycle cost (LCC) 
model, a functional performance model, and an operational performance model. The 
modeler‟s main concern shall be to concentrate on the coordination of all models. The 
assigned team members will concentrate on the development of the needed models for 
coverage and response.  
The LCC model will assess the affordability of the various alternatives. The 
functional performance model will evaluate, by means of simulation, the overall 
functionality of the system and sub-system. Simulation on the operational performance 
model will assess the impact to interoperability and overall mission effectiveness. 
 
Notional Modeling Plan  
 
The DFLSS tool Y = F(X), or transfer function, will accelerate Model 
Development planning. The transfer functions are the mathematical relationships that 
relate the output measure, denoted by Y, to input variables, collectively denoted X. It is 
usually denoted Y=f(X), with f( ) denoting the transfer function itself. The transfer 
function can be determined through the understanding of the physics and geometry of the 
system when the output measure is available, or it can be determined by empirical 






Figure 57.   Notional Functional Block Diagram for Future Model WBS. 
   This notional block diagram is for illustration purposes only. The highlighted box 
in the diagram depicts the generic design concept. The generic design is comprised 
of functional blocks. These functional blocks may be included in the transfer 
function that would depict the desired output.  
   
Systems Engineering Product Development Team Responsibilities 
 
Engineering Enablers in the Road Map 
 
Each team member should be aware of the engineering enablers built into the 
roadmap in Figure 51: 
 Concept Generation is included in the morphological matrix.  
 Risk Management is included in the current state, future state, and ideal state. 
 Requirements Generation is included in the QFD and use case analysis. 
 Structured Innovation is a method to detect problems, saving product 
development costs in rework.  
 Rapid Prototype Development is the development of the future state. 
 Baseline Design is the generic design concept in the “V” diagram. 




 The QFD captures the Voice of the Customer. 
Sub-document Deliverables 
 
The scroll-like objects, appearing in Figure 51, represent documents that are the 
deliverables listed below: 
 The Problem Situation Document will include figures with analysis and 
conclusions. 
 The Defined Requirements Document will capture all of the history of the 
decision making process for the selection of the requirement (such as the 
Kops). 
 The Use Case Model Document will capture all requirements of the 
product. 
 System Validation Document will reveal verification of design 
configuration to ideal conditions. 
 Models and Mapping Management Document is an accumulated portfolio 
of all modeling and mapping documents. 
 Technical Design Document is a log of all the technical design changes 
that happen throughout development. 
 Project Schedule is a list of events and tasks assigned a duration and 
sequence in a logical order to complete a project.  




After the generic system development is complete, an alternatives generation will 
take place. A morphological matrix will aid in the development of the alternative 




Appropriate analysis is the analysis of the alternatives using methods appropriate 
to the problem/issue/situation. This can include modeling and simulation. The 
development of a present state model in comparison with a future state model will 
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provide the basis for an analysis of alternatives. The designs may improve or degrade in 
comparison with the ideal model during multiple design iterations. The main point is that 




The main objective of the meeting minutes is to document the decisions reached 
and the actions taken by the team during meetings. A dedicated team member will take 
meeting minutes and then send them to the whole team upon completion of the meeting. 
This keeps everyone in the group informed of project progress. Furthermore, this same 
individual is responsible for keeping track of the status of all action items to ensure 




The primary stakeholder for this project is Robert C. Rubel of the Naval War 
College. Other stakeholders include Blaise Corbett of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Dahlgren Laboratory (NSWCDL); James Hebert (NSWCDL); and Eric C. Hansen Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWCCD). Blaise Corbett has six U.S. 
patents and is an expert in unmanned systems concepts. James Hebert and Eric C. Hansen 
are the patent holders for a remote sea station.  They will provide mentoring for sensors 
and hull design, respectively. Lastly, author of an analytical paper, Robert C. Rubel‟s 




Risk management is comprised of tracking the FMEA and the Gatekeeper 
process.  
 The team will fill out a FMEA matrix for the current state, the future state, 
and the ideal state. Each state will have a measure of severity of defect, 
ease of detection, and probability of occurrence. The product of all three 
parameters is the RPN number. Each transition from Current State to 
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Future State will be a storage point for a new RPN number. A plot of RPN 
numbers versus iteration will track risk improvement or degradation.  
 A gated review process along with the application of FMEA will control 




Figure 58.   Gatekeeper Process with Kanban. 
   The gatekeeper process is in place to provide a structured innovative approach 
whereby the team can stop the process to focus on key problems rapidly. The 
concepts employ Kanban, Kaizen, and Entry/Exit Criteria. Each milestone review 
















1 2 3 4 
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Milestones and Deliverables 
 
Table 9.   Deliverables Schedule. 
Milestone Description Deliverable Date 
1 Project Management Plan Approval 
Project Management Plan 
Draft  21 May 2009 
2 Integrated Product Review - #1  
Problem Definition Report 
(Effective Need; Problem 
Definition Statement)  
12 June 2009 
3 Integrated Product Review - #2  Modeling and Simulation   Summer Quarter 
4 Final Report Submission Best Alternative Fall Quarter 
5 Integrated Product Review - #3   
Project Presentation and Final 





Figure 59.   Program Management Schedule. 







Team Contact Information 
 
Table 10.   Team Member Information. 
Role/Responsibility Name Phone Number Email 




















540-653-3741 (C) carlos.perez-luna@navy.mil carlosperez_ee@hotmail.com 
Configuration 
Manager Ali Fotouhi 
703-604-2071 (W) 
703-209-6279 (C) ali.fotouhi@us.army.mil 
Scheduler Jose Umeres 202-741-1942 (W) jcumeres@nps.edu 
 
Team Advisor Contact Information 
 
Table 11.   Team Advisor Information. 
Role Name Phone Number Email 
Lead Advisor Professor Mike Green (NPS) 858-716-1319 858-735-7250 
jmgreen@nps.edu 
Advisor Professor David Hart (NPS) 831-656-3839 dahart@nps.edu 
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APPENDIX C – PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Piracy has become a growing epidemic over the past several years especially off 
the coast of Somalia. Just recently there have been attacks aimed at U.S. cargo ships that 
were transiting the busy shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. [Sky 
news 2009] These pirates that are from lawless Somalia are heavily armed with rocket 
propelled grenades and machine guns [Sky news 2009] and are no match for the unarmed 
crews of the merchant ships sailing in this area. Although some of the crews try to fight 
back or outrun the pirates, it is usually of no avail. 
One of the most recent reports mentions that since February pirates have attacked 
78 ships, hijacked 19 of them, and held 16 vessels with more than 300 hostages from 
more than a dozen countries [Kennedy 2009]. The pirates hold these hostages and ships 
for ransom. A recent outbreak in hijackings followed the U.S. Navy Seals‟ rescue of 
Captain Phillips from the Maersk Alabama, in which four more ships were seized along 
with another 60 hostages [Kennedy 2009]. “Our latest hijackings are meant to show that 
no-one can deter us from protecting our waters from the enemy because we believe in 
dying for our land,” pirate Omar Dahir Idle told reporters by telephone. “Our guns do not 
fire water. I am sure we will avenge (those killed by the U.S. Special Forces).”[Sky news 
2009] [Kennedy 2009] 
 
1.2 Background 
Somalia has a clan-based organization and a lack of central government. In 
Somalia‟s location at the Horn of Africa conditions were right for the growth of piracy in 
the 1990s. Boats illegally fishing in Somalia waters were a common sight and the pirates 
mainly wanted to secure the waters before businessmen came into the picture. In 2006, 
piracy declined due to the rise of the Islamic Courts Union. Then in December of 2006, 
pirate activity increased again because of an Ethiopian invasion into Somalia.  
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During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia was receiving money to help develop the 
fishing industry. Aid money helped improve the ships and supported maintenance 
facilities. Once the Barre regime fell out of power due to civil war, this caused the 
income from fishing to decrease. Some of the pirates are former fishermen who argue 
that foreign ships are threatening their livelihood by fishing in Somalia‟s waters. Seeing 
the profitability of piracy due to ransoms that were usually paid, warlords began to run 
the pirates‟ activities and split the profits with the pirates. In most of the hijackings, the 
pirates have not harmed the hostages and generally treat the prisoners well in anticipation 
of the large payoff. This goes as far as the pirates hiring caterers on the shores of Somalia 
to cook spaghetti, grilled fish, and roasted meat, while also having a large supply of 
cigarettes and drinks available. 
Efforts were made to combat piracy by the Transitional Federal Government by 
allowing foreign naval vessels into Somalia territorial waters. More often than not, the 
chasing of the pirates by the naval vessels had to be broken off when the pirates entered 
into the territorial waters. The Puntland has made more progress in this struggle by 
interventions. In June 2008, the Transitional Federal Government asked the international 
community for help. The United Nations Security Council voted to pass a declaration 
authorizing nations and telling them that they have the permission of the Transitional 
Federal Government to enter Somalia territorial waters to deal with the pirates 
accordingly.  
 
1.2.1 Pirates Profile 
Most of the pirates range in age from 20 to 35 years old and come from the 
Puntland region of north-eastern Somalia where the East African Seafarers‟ Association 
estimates there are at least five pirate gangs for a total about 1,000 armed men. The BBC 
reports that the pirates can be divided into three main categories: 
 Local fishermen – considered the brains of the operation due to their skill 
and knowledge of the sea 
 Ex-militiamen – used as muscle and used to fight for the warlords 
 Technical experts – operate high tech equipment such as GPS devices 
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The Web site globalsecurity.org suggests four main groups operate off the coast 
of Somalia. The National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG), commanded by Garaad 
Mohamed, who specializes in small boats and fishing vessels around the Kismayu on the 
southern coast. The Marka Group is made up of several less organized groups operating 
around the town of Marka and is led by Yusuf Indha‟adde. The third group is made up of 
traditional fishermen operating around the Puntland and is called the Puntland Group. 
The last group is the Somali Marines, which are considered the most powerful and 
sophisticated group with a military structure having a fleet admiral, admiral, vice admiral, 
and a head of financial operations. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Somalia 
1.2.1.1 Life of a Pirate 
Residents of the Puntland region, where most of the pirates come from, live a 
lavish life. “They have money; they have power and are getting stronger by the day,” 
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says Abdi Farah Juha who lives in the regional capital, Garowe. “They wed the most 
beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars; new guns,” he says. 
“Piracy in many ways is socially acceptable. They have become fashionable.” [Hunter 
2009] 
The rewards they receive are rich in a country that has been in conflict for the last 
17 years and half the population needs food aid. Most of the captured vessels bring an 
average of $2 million, and this is why the hostages are well looked after [Hunter 2009]. 
As one can see, being a pirate in this country can be very appealing. This leads to more 
men wanting to become pirates. 
 
1.2.2 Tactics 
The pirates started out using small, slow boats called skiffs. These skiffs were too 
slow and rickety to catch anything other than slow unmaintained boats. The skiffs could 
only venture a few miles from the coast [Wired.com 2009].  
Then the pirates innovated and began to capture trawlers and small freight ships. 
They used these as “mother-ships” to launch their attacks from. Today, the pirates will 
tow along two or three skiffs with these mother-ships and carry form 10 to 20 pirates. As 
a merchant ship approaches, they will send out the skiffs to engage the ships [Wired.com 
2009].  
 
2.0     Combating the Pirates 
This often begins with a distress call form a merchant ship reporting an attack. 
Other times a patrol plane may spot a potential pirate mother-ship or skiff. This 
information is relayed to the naval commanders who sort through a list of the available 
warships in the area and determine who is the quickest to respond [Wired.com 2009]. 
When the warship is close enough, it will launch its helicopter to scout ahead and 
get confirmation that the hostiles are armed, while simultaneously preparing to lower the 
boarding team boats into the seas [Wired.com 2009]. All of this takes time and if a 
warship is not in the area, that gives more time for the pirates to hijack the vessel. Just the 




2.1  Show of Force 
 
Deterring an attack on a vessel or avoiding a firefight first requires that a warship 
be in the area when the pirates strike [Wired.com 2009]. With the pirates operating 
hundreds of miles off shore and covering an area of about 1.1 million square miles, one 
can see that this is one large piece of real estate to cover [Kennedy 2009]. At present, 
there are only about 20 warships from 14 different countries operating in the Indian 
Ocean [Wired.com 2009].  
 
  
Fig. 2 Pirate attacks in 2007 
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It is nearly impossible for only 20 warships to have a positive effect of deterring 
pirating in this vast area of ocean. There needs to be a greater presence of deterrence. 
Naval forces have halted many attacks but the area is so vast that they cannot stop all of 
the hijackings [Kennedy 2009]. 
 
2.1.1 The Problem 
The Gulf of Aden connects the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, 
which happens to be the shortest route from Europe to Asia and has the busiest shipping 
lanes in the world. More than 20,000 ships traverse this route a year [Kennedy 2009]. The 
ratio is approximately 1,000 ships to 1 warship, so how can adequate protection be given 
to all of those vessels? 
The answer may appear simple. Increase the number of warships in the area. 
However, the answer is not that easy to achieve, especially in today‟s world. Today the 
U.S. Navy is extremely small compared to what it once was and the cost of a new ship 
and crew to maintain that ship is escalating rapidly. So now, the question becomes how 








Figure 60.   House of Quality Analysis: Platforms vs. CTQs. 
   Reference Item 1 and Reference item 2: The oil platform is less effective than the remote automated sea station.  Reference item 3: 
There is a lot of input to the defender not reaching the target on time. The next greatest input is to increase the range of the system. 
The third need is to have scalability of weapons to minimize cost.  Reference item 4: High importance ranks in the following way: 









Figure 61.   House of Quality: CTQ vs. Functions. 






Figure 62.   Housse of Quality: Functions vs. Requirements. 
























































APPENDIX F – WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (WBS) 
















Figure 63.   Function Structure Diagram: Aerostat. 
   This is a function structure diagram of the aerostat system. The diagram shows 
















Figure 64.   Function Structure Diagram: USV. 
   This is a function structure diagram of the USV system. The diagram shows how 














Figure 65.   Function Structure Diagram: UAV. 
   This is a function structure diagram of the UAV system. The diagram shows how 




















Figure 66.   Function Structure Diagram: Command Ship. 
   This is a function structure diagram of the command ship system. The diagram 






















Figure 67.   Function Structure Diagram: Tanker. 
   This is a function structure diagram of the tanker system. The diagram shows how 
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Figure 68.   Interaction Diagram. 
   The interaction diagram is a matrix that shows how various components of the ASHC interrelate with each other. Each square 
relates to physically touching, energy transfer, information exchange, and material exchange. The numbers in the square correspond 
to the need of the interrelationship with the other components. 
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Figure 69.   SIMIO Screen Shot: Warship with One UAV. 
   This figure is an actual screen shot of the SIMIO simulation of a warship with one UAV. At the top of the figure are the different 
phases and where they are located in the simulation. 
UAV  





Figure 70.   SIMIO Screen Shot: Warship with Two UAVs. 
   This figure is an actual screen shot of the SIMIO simulation of a warship with two UAVs. At the top of the figure are the different 
phases and where they are located in the simulation. 
UAV  





Figure 71.   SIMIO Screen Shot: Remote Sea Station with Two UAVs.  
   This figure is an actual screen shot of the SIMIO simulation of a Remote Sea Station with two UAVs. At the top of the figure are the 
different phases and where they are located in the simulation. 
UAV  




APPENDIX J – SPEED VS DISTANCE MATRIX 




























APPENDIX K – SENSITIVITY PLOTS AND RESPONSE 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Figure 72.   Sensitivity Analysis of Warship with One UAV. 
   The sensitivity plot shows the process that takes the most time during the Warship 
with One UAV simulation. 
 
 
Figure 73.   Frequency Analysis of Warship with One UAV. 
   The frequency analysis shows the different probabilities of the times that occurred 




Figure 74.   Sensitivity Analysis of Warship with Two UAVs. 
   The sensitivity plot shows the process that takes the most time during the Warship 
with Two UAVs simulation. 
 
 
Figure 75.   Frequency Analysis of Warship with Two UAVs. 
   The frequency analysis shows the different probabilities of the times that occurred 






Figure 76.   Sensitivity Analysis of Remote Sea Station (MDS shown here) with Two 
UAVs. 
   The sensitivity plot shows the process that takes the most time during the Remote 
Sea Station (MDS shown here) with Two UAVs simulation. 
 
 
Figure 77.   Frequency Analysis of Remote Sea Station (MDS shown here) with Two 
UAVs. 
   The frequency analysis shows the different probabilities of the times that occurred 




























APPENDIX L – SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ROADMAP 
DECOMPOSITION 
 
Figure 78.  DoD Combined DMEDI/DMAIC Design for Lean Six Sigma Approach. 
  Developed for the Department of Defense in 2007, Design for Lean Six Sigma Tools 
from the DMEDI process were combined with  Lean and DMAIC Six sigma Tools.  




Figure 79.  DMEDI Define Phase Model 
  The systems engineering roadmap utilized Define phase DMEDI tools: Charter 
and FMEA. [U.S. DoD 2007] 
Define Measure Explore Develop Implement































Figure 80.  DMEDI Measure Phase Model 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Measure phase DMEDI tools: SIPOC, 
FMEA, Work Structure Diagrams, and QFD. [U.S. DoD 2007] 
 
 
Figure 81.  DMEDI Explore Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Explore phase DMEDI tools: 
Hierarchy Diagram, Work Structure Diagram, Morphological Matrix and Pugh 




















Figure 82.  DMEDI Explore Phase Model (Cont.). 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Explore phase DMEDI tools: QFD, 




Figure 83.  DMEDI Develop Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Develop phase DMEDI tools: 











Figure 84.   DMEDI Implement Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Implement phase DMEDI tools: QFD. 
[U.S. DoD 2007]  
 
 
Figure 85.  DMAIC Define Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Define Phase Tools from DMAIC: 











Figure 86.  DMAIC Measure & Analyze Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Measure and Analyze Phase DMAIC 




Figure 87.  DMAIC Improve Phase Model. 
  The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Improve Phase DMAIC Tools: Future 
















Figure 88.  DMAIC Model Control Phase Model. 
 The Systems Engineering Roadmap utilized Control tools from Lean and DMAIC:  
























Principles of Error Proofing
Minimize the effects of human errors.
Error Proofing
LossesSmall Large
The percentage indicates the ratio of examples corresponding to each principle.
Prevention of Occurrence
Prevent the occurrence of human errors
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APPENDIX M – STATISTICAL DATA 










Figure 89.  Overlay Chart. 
  Overlay Plot depicts the interaction between the enemy, HVA, RSS, Warship 1, 
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Enemy – P<alpha, reject null 
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APPENDIX N – ACRONYMS LIST 
Acronym Term 
4 M‟s Machinery, Mother Nature (environment), Method, Manpower 
ASCMs Advanced Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 
ASHC Automated Super-Highway Concept 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance System 
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight 
C2 Command and Control 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
CM Configuration Management 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CPI Continuous Process Improvement 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
CTC Critical-to-the-Customer 
CTP Critical-to-Process 
CTQ Critical to Quality 
CTX Critical to X 
DCOV Define, Characterize, Optimize, and Validate 
DFLSS TOOLS Design for Lean Six Sigma tools 
DFLSS 
TOOLSBB Design for Lean Six Sigma tools Black Belt 
DL Distance Learning 
DMEDI Define, Modify, Explore, Design, Implement 
DoD Department of Defense  
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EOIR Electro Optical Infra Red 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FRACAS Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System 





HSPD-13               Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 
HVA High Value Asset 
HVA2 High Value Asset 2 
JTIC Joint Tactical Intelligence Center 
KTS Knots 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LOS Line of Sight 
LVA Low Value Asset 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
MARS Mission Agile Robotic Systems 
MDS Maritime Domain System 
MFR Multi-Function Phased Array Radar 
Min Minutes 
MIW Mine Warfare 
MOC Maritime Operations Center 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
MSSE Masters of Science in Systems Engineering 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCW Network Centric Warfare 
Nm Nautical Miles 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSWCCD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
NSWCDL Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Lab 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
QFD Quality Function Deployment 
RADHAZ Radiation Hazards 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
RSS Remote  Sea Station 
RF Radio Frequency 
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
RPN Risk Prioritization Number 
SIMIO Simulation modeling software 




A        SME cronym                Subject Matter Expert Term 
SSGNs Special Service Groups Navy 
SUW Surface Warfare 
TOC Theory of Constraints 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
VOC Voice of the Customer 
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